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LOST OPPORTUNITIES: THE UNDERUSE OF TAX WHISTLEBLOWERS 
Karie Davis-Nozemack* and Sarah J. Webber† 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Legal literature on whistleblower programs often assumes an agency’s ability to 
effectively use a whistleblower tip.   This article challenges that assumption in the 
context of tax enforcement by exposing the Internal Revenue Service’s dismal 
performance. The article uses Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, taxpayer privacy law, as 
well as whistleblower and tax enforcement literature to propose a new approach to using 
information from tax whistleblowers.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Last year the Internal Revenue Service (“Service”) received more than 9,000 tips 
from whistleblowers.3 The Service’s current backlog of whistleblower tips is more than 
22,000.4  In the last five years under the formalized IRS Whistleblower Program, the 
program has made approximately 100 awards per year.5  With so much information 
pouring into the Service, why has the Service capitalized on so few tips? This paper 
argues that answer lies in the Service’s approach to whistleblowers and the administrative 
burdens that weigh down the program.  Together these issues produce an environment 
where a whistleblower tip is often not a short cut to successful enforcement but a 
meandering path to nowhere. 
 
A close analysis of the program shows the program’s deficiencies to be internal to the 
agency.  The primary deficiency is the underutilization of whistleblowers.  Simply put, 
the Service does not seek all available information and assistance from whistleblowers. 
The Service’s policies for interviewing whistleblowers, often referred to as debriefing, 
are a lens with which to view the underutilization. In the past six years, the Service has 
taken a variety of approaches to interviewing whistleblowers.  Initially, the Service had 
no formal policy on meeting with whistleblowers, then adopted a policy of meeting with 
whistleblowers only a single time,6 and then moved to a policy of meeting with 
whistleblowers only on a case-by-case basis.7 Most recently, in August 2014, the Service 
adopted a policy of debriefing some whistleblowers.8  None of these policies have 
allowed the Service to efficiently leverage the tips and nimbly integrate whistleblower 
information into the enforcement process.  
 
The ineffective prior policies are a result of (1) overreaction to mild legal obstacles, 
(2) Service culture that is resistant to incorporating whistleblower information, and (3) an 
overly burdensome administrative process for utilizing whistleblower tips. In 2012 and 
2014, Service executives published memos encouraging the debriefing of 
whistleblowers.9  While these pronouncements were steps in the right direction, the 
policy pronouncements were largely aspirational, fail to provide appropriate procedures 
for debriefing, and consequently leave Service personnel with insufficient guidance.  
 
Legal literature on whistleblower programs often assumes an agency’s ability to 
                                                
3 See IRS WHISTLEBLOWER OFFICE, FISCAL YEAR 2013 REPORT TO THE CONGRESS ON THE USE OF 
SECTION 7623, at tbl 1 (9,268 total claims received for Fiscal Year 2013).  
4 See id. at tbl 1 (22,330 Claims Open ending Fiscal Year 2013). 
5 See id. at tbl 6 (110 awards paid in FY 2009, 97 awards paid in FY 2010, 97 awards paid in FY 2011, 
128 awards paid in FY 2012, and 122 awards paid in FY 2013).  
6 See Office of Chief Counsel Notice, CC-2008-011, Limitations on Informant Contacts: Current 
Employees and Taxpayer Representatives, (Feb. 27, 2008) at 1-2. 
7 See Office of Chief Counsel Notice, CC-2010-004, Clarification of CC Notice 2008-011 - Limitations 
on Informant Contacts: Current Employees and Taxpayer Representatives, (Feb. 17, 2010) at 2. 
8 See Memo from John Dalrymple, Deputy Commissioner for Enforcement to Commissioner, Large 
Business and International et al, at 1-2 (Aug. 20, 2014) [hereinafter Dalrymple Memo]. 
9 See Memo from Steven Miller, Deputy Commissioner for Enforcement to Commissioner, Large 
Business and International et al, at 2 (Jun. 20, 2012), http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-
utl/field_directive_dated_june_20_2012.pdf [hereinafter Miller Memo]. 
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effectively utilize a whistleblower tip.   This article challenges that assumption and uses 
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, taxpayer privacy law, as well as whistleblower and tax 
enforcement literature to suggest policy improvements. This article uses a critical eye to 
examine legal constraints for debriefing tax whistleblowers and, in light of the findings, 
proposes a new approach.  In Part I, the article makes the case for the importance of 
whistleblowers, particularly for tax enforcement. Given the assistance that tax 
whistleblowers could bring to the Service’s enforcement mission, Part II of the article 
then discusses the evolution of Service’s policies for receiving information from 
whistleblowers.  These prior policies appear to be an overreaction to the mild legal 
obstacles, which are discussed in Part III.  Finally, Part IV presents new approaches to 
debriefing.  In particular, Part IV suggests expanding the parameters of debriefing beyond 
its current confined usage.  It also explains that debriefing is useful beyond the gathering 
substantive information and could introduce efficiencies in whistleblower tip processing.  
 
I. WHY USE TAX WHISTLEBLOWERS? 
 
The Service is under pressure to raise more revenue and administer new tax credits 
with fewer resources.  Given this pressure, the Service cannot waste any available 
resources. The following Part makes the case for the Service’s general need for 
enforcement assistance and specific need for whistleblower assistance. 
 
A.  The Service is Struggling with Tax Compliance 
 
At last official measurement in 2006, the U.S. Treasury failed to receive $385 billion 
in taxes annually.10 The current estimate of missing tax revenue has risen to $450 
billion.11 While a variety of factors contribute to the shockingly large tax gap,12 the vast 
majority of the tax gap is attributable to underreported taxes.13  The income linked to 
these unreported taxes never appears on any tax return.   
 
Identifying underreported taxes is the duty of the Service’s enforcement programs 
and staff. The Service’s recent enforcement efforts have been increasingly less effective 
in collecting missing tax revenues. The Service exhibits a multi-year trend of declining 
revenue from its enforcement activities.14  The declining enforcement revenue correlates 
                                                
10 See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., IRS RELEASES NEW TAX GAP ESTIMATES; COMPLIANCE RATES 
REMAIN STATISTICALLY UNCHANGED FROM PREVIOUS STUDY, http://www.irs.gov/uac/IRS-Releases-New-
Tax-Gap-Estimates;-Compliance-Rates-Remain-Statistically-Unchanged-From-Previous-Study.   
11 See Hearing on Review of the President’s Fiscal Year 2015 Funding Request for the Department of 
the Treasury and the Internal Revenue Service Before Subcomm. on Financial Services and General 
Government of S. Comm. on Appropriations 23 (Apr. 30, 2014) [hereinafter George Senate Testimony] 
(statement of J. Russell George, Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration) 
12 The tax gap is the difference between projected revenue and the amount collected. See generally U. 
S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, UPDATE ON REDUCING THE FEDERAL TAX GAP AND IMPROVING VOLUNTARY 
COMPLIANCE (2009); JAMES M. BICKLEY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL41582, TAX GAP, TAX 
ENFORCEMENT, AND TAX COMPLIANCE PROPOSALS IN THE 112TH CONGRESS (2011). 
13 See George Senate Testimony, supra note __ (stating the tax gap is primarily based on taxpayers’ 
underreporting of taxes, comprising $376 billion or approximately 84% of the total tax gap).  
14  See Hearing on the State of the IRS, Before the Subcomm. on Oversight of H. Comm. on Ways and 
Means, at 6 (Feb. 5, 2014) [hereinafter Koskinen House Testimony] (statement of John A. Koskinen, 
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with a drop in the number of returns audited as well as fewer enforcement staff.15  
 
Due to budget pressure, the Service has recently shrunk its staff by more than 6 
percent.16 The Service’s shrinking staff comes at an inopportune time because the 
Service’s budget has not kept pace with its expanding task list.17 For example, the Service 
has recently begun collecting information from 77,000 foreign financial institutions under 
the Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FACTA) in an attempt to monitor offshore 
assets.18  Additionally, the Service’s mission has expanded far beyond that of revenue 
collector to include benefits administrator. 19   The Service is now responsible for 
implementing significant portions of the Affordable Care Act.20  Furthermore, the agency 
must monitor increasingly sophisticated and international business transactions as 
commerce becomes more global in nature.21   
 
The recent budgetary and mission pressures compound the structural disadvantage 
                                                                                                                                            
Com’r Internal Revenue Service) 
http://waysandmeans.house.gov/uploadedfiles/irs_2014_testimony_wm20514_final__version_020414.pdf 
 (“… the total is still down by more than $4.2 billion from four years ago, and we are concerned about the 
steady decline since the high point of $59.2 billion in FY 2007. The reason for this decline is primarily due 
to a decline in revenue from audits, which dropped nearly $400 million in FY 2013 to $9.83 billion, the 
lowest level in a decade. This decline in audit revenue is attributable to a decline in the number of returns 
audited. The IRS audited the returns of approximately 1.4 million individuals in FY 2013, down 5 percent 
from FY 2012 and the lowest level since 1.39 million audits in FY 2008. The audit coverage rate – the 
number of audits divided by the number of tax returns – fell below 1 percent to 0.96 percent in FY 2013, 
the lowest level since FY 2006. Audits of high-income individuals – defined as those with $1 million or 
more in income – fell 3.7 percent as well last year. The IRS examined approximately 61,000 business 
returns in FY 2013, down 13 percent from FY 2012.”).  
15 See Koskinen House Testimony, supra note __ (noting there were 1,300 fewer Service employees in 
examinations, collections, and investigations in FY 2013, resulting in a 6.4 percent workforce reduction 
that coincided with a decrease in the total number of audits performed).  
16 See NATIONAL TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, FISCAL YEAR 2012 REPORT TO THE CONGRESS at 34 (2013) 
(highlighting continued IRS budget cuts as a one of the greatest risks to long-term tax administration). 
17 See Anna Bernasek, At the IRS, Trying to Collect More with Less, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 7, 2014) 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/09/business/yourtaxes/at-the-irs-trying-to-collect-more-with-
less.html?_r=0. See also Howard Gleckman, IRS Gets Hammered in the 2014 Budget Agreement, FORBES 
(Jan. 14, 2014) http://www.forbes.com/sites/beltway/2014/01/14/irs-gets-hammered-in-the-2014-budget-
agreement/ 
18 See Chuck Marr and Joel Friedman, Cuts in IRS Budget Have Compromised Taxpayer Service and 
Weakened Enforcement, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL'Y PRIORITIES, 8, (Jun. 25, 2014), 
http://www.cbpp.org/files/6-25-14tax.pdf (noting the increasing responsibilities related to FACTA).  
19 See NATIONAL TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, FISCAL YEAR 2011 REPORT TO THE CONGRESS at 3 (2012) 
(“In addition, we note that the role of the IRS has expanded recently from one focused on tax collection to 
one that also involves distributing benefits to a variety of individuals and businesses.” (citing the First-
Time Homebuyer Credit, American Opportunity Tax Credit, and Patient Protection and Affordable Care 
Act of 2010)). See also Bernasek, supra note __ (“Last year alone, staff positions in enforcement dropped 
6.4 percent, to the lowest total in a decade: 19,531.”).  
20 See Hearing on ACA – Information Technology Readiness And Data Security Before the Subcomm. 
on Energy Policy, Health Care And Entitlements of H. Comm. on Oversight And Government Reform and 
Before the Subcomm. on Cybersecurity, Infrastructure Protection, And Security Technologies of H. Comm. 
On Homeland Security (Jul. 17, 2013) (statement of Alan R. Duncan, Assistant Inspector General for 
Audit) http://www.treasury.gov/tigta/congress/congress_07172013.pdf 
21 See Saule Omarova, Wall Street as Community of Fate: Toward Financial Industry Self –Regulation, 
159 U. PA. L. REV. 411 (2011).   
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with which the Service contends.  Enforcement is inherently challenging because of the 
perpetual informational asymmetry of tax administration.22  Because the Service has less 
information than a taxpayer about a taxpayer’s transactions and the Service nearly always 
receives a taxpayer’s information in summary form, the Service must play a game of 
informational catch up to police revenue collection.23 
 
The Service has attempted to use technology to both educate taxpayers and identify 
fraudulent returns;24 however, current technology is not yet an adequate substitute for 
enforcement personnel and information leverage.  With the enormous stress on Service 
resources, the Service can ill afford to ignore available enforcement tools.25 This is why 
whistleblowers are such a critical tool for the Service. 
 
B.  From Informant to Whistleblower 
 
An informant has the potential to substitute for enforcement personnel by identifying 
wrongdoing and by providing a roadmap for prosecution.  Law enforcement personnel on 
federal, state and local levels make extensive use of informants to aid in enforcement.26 
The use of informants in local law enforcement, illegal narcotics, and terrorism is 
virtually ubiquitous.27  In many areas, informant usage has replaced many other law 
enforcement techniques.28 Informant usage is common because of structural limits to 
investigative methods and limited agency resources. 29   Even those who call for 
                                                
22 See Leandra Lederman, Reducing Information Gaps To Reduce The Tax Gap: When Is Information 
Reporting Warranted?, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 1733, 1735 (2010) (observing that a key problem within tax 
enforcement is asymmetric information whereby the taxpayer has facts regarding his or her transactions 
throughout the year and the Service must obtain such information from the taxpayer or from third parties).  
23 See e.g., INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., FORM 1220 (requiring total sales as a single line-item on the 
return).  
24 See Koskinen House Testimony , supra note ___.  
25 See NATIONAL TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, FISCAL YEAR 2011 REPORT TO THE CONGRESS at 3 (2012) 
(noting the Service is seeing an increase workload with decreasing resources resulting in several negative 
outcomes including failure to adequately detect tax noncompliance and an inability to maximize revenue 
collection).  
26 See Alexandra Natapoff, Snitching: The Institutional and Communal Consequences, 73 U. CIN. L. 
REV. 645, 655 (2004) (“It is undisputed that informant use is on the rise.” (citing Michael A. Simons, 
Retribution for Rats: Cooperation, Punishment, and Atonement, 56 VAND. L. REV. 1, 3 (2003) 
(“Cooperation has never been more prevalent than it is today.”); Ian Weinstein, Regulating the Market for 
Snitches, 47 BUFF. L. REV. 563, 563-4 (1999) (describing “significant increase in cooperation”))). See also 
David R. Luri, Sixth Amendment Implication of Information Participation in Defense Meetings, 58 
FORDHAM L. REV. 795, 795 (1990) (noting that 39 percent of surveyed attorneys had previously 
encountered confidential informants during client representation (citing Genego, The New Adversary, 54 
BROOKLYN L. REV. 781, 807 (1988))). 
27 See Natapoff, The Institutional and Communal Consequences, supra note __ at 650 (noting the wide 
informant usage via anecdotal evidence but limited public data available on informant usage).  
28 See Andrew Tasliz, Prosecuting the Informant Culture, 109 MICH. L. REV. 1077, 1077 (2011) 
(reviewing ALEXANDRA NATAPOFF, SNITCHING: CRIMINAL INFORMANTS AND THE EROSION OF AMERICAN 
JUSTICE (2009)). 
29 See Michael Rich, War, Terror, and the Federal Courts, Ten Years after 9/11: Article: Brass Rings 
and Red-Headed Stepchildren: Protecting Active Criminal Informants, 61 AM. U. L. REV. 1433, 1435 
(2012) (observing that informants play a critical role as a law enforcement tool, especially informants who 
have continued connections to the criminal underworld).  
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diminished use of informants generally have not suggested diminished use for white-
collar offenders because these offenders would likely go undetected and unpunished.30  
 
Society has come to accept and appreciate whistleblowing as an important part of 
enforcement. 31  The term whistleblower is more frequently used than informant, 
particularly involving business and white-collar wrongdoing.32  Indeed, the Service 
previously used the term informant but has since updated its terminology to 
whistleblower.33 Society’s etymological change is due to greater acceptance of the act of 
whistleblowing, which is associated with diminishing trust in corporations as an 
institution.34 For most of last century, trust in corporations and the high value placed on 
loyalty and fidelity created societal distaste for whistleblowing.35 The 1960s and 1970s 
marked changing attitudes regarding corporations and their conduct. 36  As one 
commentator has suggested, “the cultural shift from reverence to distrust of large 
corporations led to an attitudinal change toward external whistleblowing.”37  Since then, 
academics have conceived of whistleblowing as a control instrument38 and a private 
monitoring tool supplementing governmental regulation and civil litigation.    
 
For a potential whistleblower to be an effective private monitoring tool, the 
whistleblower must have access to relevant information and sufficient incentive to 
disclose that information. 39  Early social science research 40  indicated that higher 
                                                
30 See Tasliz, supra note __ at 1078. 
31 See Richard Haigh and Peter Bowal, Whistleblowing and the Freedom of Conscience: Towards a 
New Legal Analysis, 35 DALHOUSIE L. J. 89, 90 (2012) (discussing the changing perceptions of 
whistleblowing).  
32 See Peter Jubb, Whistleblowing: A Restrictive Definition and Interpretation, 21 J. OF BUS. ETHICS 77 
(1999) (noting the rise of term).   See also Genenva Campbell, Snitch or Savior? How the Modern Cultural 
Acceptance of the Pharmaceutical Company Employee External Whistleblowing is Reflected in Dodd-
Frank and the Affordable Care Act, 15.2 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 565, 573-576 (2013). See also Amanda C. Leiter, 
Soft Whistleblowing, 48 GA. L. REV. 425, 435 (2014) (comparing Professor Terry Morehead Dworkin’s 
definition of whistleblowing with statutory definitions of whistleblowing).   
33 The IRS Informants’ Rewards Program was renamed as the IRS Whistleblowers Program following 
the 2006 I.R.C. § 7623 amendments. See I.R.M. 25.2.2.1(3), Overview: Authority and Policy (as amended 
Jun. 18, 2010).  (“The IRS has generally referred to persons who submit information under section 7623 as 
‘informants’ and referred to the program as the ‘Informant Claims Program.’ The IRS has also referred to 
such persons as ‘claimants’ in published guidance, and the law now refers to the "Whistleblower Office" 
and ‘whistleblower program.’ Accordingly, the terms ‘claimant’ and ‘whistleblower’ will be used in this 
IRM except where the term ‘informant’ appears in an office title or published document. However, no legal 
significance should be inferred based solely on the use of these terms in this IRM.”). 
34 See Campbell, supra note __ at 571-573 (2013) (citing ALAN F. WESTIN, WHISTLE BLOWING! 
LOYALTY AND DISSENT IN THE CORPORATION 1-4 (1981)).  
35 See id. 
36 See id (citing WESTIN, supra note __ at 4-6 (1981) and BERNARD RUBIN ET AL, BIG BUSINESS AND 
THE MASS MEDIA 169 (1977)). 
37 See id at 574.  
38 See Peter Jubb, Whistleblowing: A Restrictive Definition and Interpretation, 21 J. OF BUS. ETHICS 77 
(1999). 
39 See Alexander Dyck, Adair Morse, Luigi Zingales, Who Blows the Whistle in Corporate Fraud, 65.6 
J. OF FIN. 2213, 2214-7 (2010).  See also John A. Martin and James G. Combs, Does it Take A Village to 
Raise a Whistleblower, ACAD. MGMT. PERSP. 83, 84 (May 2011).  
40 See Janet P. Near and Marcia P. Miceli, Whistleblowing: Myth and Reality, 22.3 J. MGMT. 507-526 
(1996) (including a literature review of pre-1996 research on whistleblower attributes, including personality 
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professional status, long service, a more positive attitude toward their jobs, and a 
likelihood of having won a performance award in the previous two years were predictors 
of whistleblowing.41 A more recent meta-analysis of whistleblower research suggests that 
some of these antecedents may be more related to a whistleblower’s access to 
information about wrongdoing as opposed to attributes of whistleblowing.42 Under either 
analysis, the result is a subset of well-placed employees with access to relevant 
information.  
 
The second prerequisite to a whistleblower functioning as a private monitor is a 
sufficient incentive to act. Research indicates that whistleblowers likely have mixed 
motives.43  Some are motivated to help themselves individually, and some are motivated 
to assist other people, be it colleagues, related parties, or society generally.44 It is difficult 
to determine actual whistleblower motivation because what potential whistleblowers say 
about what motivates them to blow the whistle may differ from what actually motivates 
them.45  Research has shown, however, what is likely to inhibit people from blowing the 
whistle.  A study of more than 3,000 respondents indicated that the most common reasons 
for failing to blow the whistle are the perceptions that nothing could or would be done 
about the wrongdoing.46 When wrongdoing is reported, many whistleblowers must blow 
the whistle more than once because the first attempt is often ineffective.47  Indeed, 
                                                                                                                                            
variables); Jessica R. Mesmer-Mangus and Chockalingam Viswesvaran, Whistleblowing in Organizations: 
An Examination of Correlates of Whistleblowing Intentions, Actions and Retaliations, 62 J. BUS. ETHICS 
277-297 (2005) (including a meta analysis of whistleblower personality variables for pre-2005 research); 
Marcia P. Miceli and Janet P. Near, When Do Observers of Organization Wrongdoing Step Up?: Recent US 
Research on the Factors Associated with Whistleblowing, at 81-84 in DAVID B. LEWIS, A GLOBAL 
APPROACH TO PUBLIC INTEREST DISCLOSURE  (2010) (summarizing whistleblower attribute research 
through 2010).  
41 See Terry Morehead Dworkin and Janet P. Near, A Better Statutory Approach to Whistleblowing, 7.1 
BUS. ETHICS Q. 1, 67-7 (1997) 
42 See Marcia P. Miceli, Janet P. Near, Michael T. Rehg, James R. Van Scotter, Predicting Employee 
Reactions to Perceived Organizational Wrongdoing: Demoralization, Justice, Proactive Personality, and 
Whistleblowing, 65.8 HUM. REL. 923, 945 (2012). 
43 See Janet P. Near, Michael T. Rehg, James R. Van Scotter, and Marcia P. Miceli, Does Type of 
Wrongdoing Affect the Whistleblowing Process, 14.2 BUS. ETHICS Q. 219, 220 (2004) (citing J.B. Dozier 
and Marcia P. Miceli, Potential Predictors of Whistleblowing: A Prosocial Behavior Perspective, 10 ACAD. 
MGMT. REV. 823-36 (1985); MARCIA P. MICELI AND JANET P. NEAR, BLOWING THE WHISTLE: THE 
ORGANIZATIONAL AND LEGAL IMPLICATIONS FOR COMPANIES AND EMPLOYEES (1992); D. Bash and T. 
Friedlen, FBI Agent Blows Whistle on Moussaoui Probe: “I Had to Do What I Believed Was Right, 
CNN.COM (2002)).  See also Siddharta Dasgupta and Ankit Kesharwani, Whistleblowing: A Survey of 
Literature, 9.4 IUP J. CORP. GOVERNANCE 1, 6 (2010) (summarizing the literature on the motivations of 
whistleblowers).  
44 See Miceli and Near, When Do Observers of Organization Wrongdoing Step Up?, supra  note __ at 
77.  See also Mary L. Schapiro, Chairman, Securities Exchange Commission, Opening Statement at 
Securities Exchange Commission Open Meeting, Item 2 Whistleblower Program (May 25, 2011), 
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2011/spch052511mls-item2.htm (stating that whistleblowers come 
forward to right a wrong). 
45 See Miceli and Near, When Do Observers of Organization Wrongdoing Step Up?, supra  note __ at 
80.   
46 See Near, Rehg, Van Scotter, and Miceli, supra note __ at 237-8.  
47 See Eileen Z. Taylor and Mary B. Curtis, An Examination of the Layers of Workplace Influences in 
Ethical Judgments: Whistleblowing Likelihood and Perseverance in Public Accounting, 93 J. OF BUS. 
ETHICS 21, 22 (2010). 
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external whistleblowers usually attempt to blow the whistle internally first. 48  
 
C.  Tax Whistleblowers 
 
As with whistleblowers generally, tax whistleblowers appear well-placed.49 They may 
be motivated by the Service’s monetary awards for tips that generate revenue, potential 
grants of immunity for their own culpable conduct, their own morals, other 
considerations, or some combination thereof.  Based on prior research of whistleblowers 
generally, tax whistleblowers will not be motivated if they perceive that the Service is 
unlikely or unwilling to act upon their information.50 As such, positive public perception 
of the Service’s willingness to act and effectiveness are critical to a functional program.  
 
The effectiveness of tax whistleblower tips is not easy to ascertain but shows 
empirical promise.  The only information available on the effectiveness of tax 
whistleblowers is from a prior program that had drawn only a dozen tips involving more 
than $2 million. 51  Under these limited circumstances, examinations involving 
whistleblowers raised nearly twice as much revenue per hour as examinations flagged 
through traditional methods. 52  Whistleblower involvement in an examination also 
lowered the percentage of examinations resulting in no additional revenue.53  Simply put, 
a successful examination involving a whistleblower tip raised, on average, more revenue 
than one without a whistleblower tip. This data suggests that whistleblowers can be a 
cost-effective tool to counteract the inherent information asymmetry the Service faces; 
however, the direct applicability of this data is limited because it involves a small, 
predecessor whistleblower program with significantly different processes, available 
bounties, and public awareness.  What we can take from this data is that when a good 
whistleblower tip is actually used in an examination, it increases the efficiency and 
productivity of an examination.  
 
The ultimate objective of any tax whistleblower program should be to improve tax 
enforcement and collection through more efficient examinations.  To that end, the Service 
needs policies that assist in fulfilling the theoretical and practical promise of 
                                                
48 See Miceli and Near, When Do Observers of Organization Wrongdoing Step Up, supra note __ at 84 
(“Most whistleblowers use internal channels to report wrongdoing; the majority of those who use external 
channels have first used internal channels.”).  
49 Unfortunately, the extreme secrecy of the Service’s whistleblower program means that the only 
current data publicly available on whistleblower claims is that in the Service’s Whistleblower Office annual 
report to Congress. See WHISTLEBLOWER OFFICE, FY 2013 REPORT.  THe report gives no information on 
tax whistleblower identities, attributes or motivations.  As such, we must rely on the available social 
science data about whistleblower generally to opine about tax whistleblowers.  The authors know of no 
reason, however, to believe that tax whistleblowers differ in any material way from other whistleblowers. 
50 See supra Part I.B. 
51 See TIGTA 2006 Report, supra note ___.  
52 See TREASURY INSPECTOR GEN. FOR TAX ADMIN., THE INFORMANTS' REWARD PROGRAM NEEDS 
MORE CENTRALIZED MANAGEMENT OVERSIGHT (2006), [hereinafter TIGTA 2006 Report] 
http://www.treasury.gov/ tigta/auditreports/2006reports/200630092fr.pdf.   See also Edward Morse, 
Whistleblowers and Tax Enforcement: Using Inside Information to Close the “Tax Gap,” 24 AKRON TAX J. 
1, 11-13 (2009) (interpreting the 2006 TIGTA report data). 
53 See Morse, supra note __.  
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whistleblower assistance.  The next Part discusses how the Service interacts with 
whistleblowers and concludes with a discussion of troubling policies that underuse 
whistleblowers.  
 
II. WHISTLEBLOWER TIP PROCESSING AND DEBRIEFING 
 
 The following Part identifies the Service’s policies for interacting with 
whistleblowers.  After briefly noting the origins of the modern tax whistleblower 
program, 54 Part II describes how the Service receives information from whistleblowers 
and the breakdowns in the processing of tax whistleblower tips.55   
 
A.  Program History and Statutory Basis 
 
 Prior to the Tax Relief and Health Care Act of 2006,56 the Service paid whistleblower 
awards under a discretionary system.57  The still-codified provision gave the Service 
complete discretion over all whistleblower awards, including discretion over the decision 
whether to pay and the amount of any whistleblower award.58  The Service’s complete 
discretion over payment resulted in uncertainty for whistleblowers until the 2006 
overhaul to the Whistleblower Program.59  
 
The 2006 statutory changes created an additional provision that authorizes a 15 to 30 
percent award from the collected proceeds if the tip alleges business tax delinquencies of 
                                                
54 See infra Part I.A. 
55 For the purposes of this article, the authors define tax whistleblower claims as those eligible for 
awards under I.R.C. § 7623.  Other individuals are, of course, permitted to provide anonymous tips to the 
Service regarding delinquent taxpayers.  See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., FORM 3949A (form on which to 
provide non-award tips to the Service).  The focus of this article, however, lies with the Service’s collection 
of tips from employee whistleblowers and subject to § 7623. 
56 See Tax Relief and Health Care Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-432, § 406, 120 Stat. 2958 (2006) 
(amending I.R.C. § 7623). 
57 See Kwon, supra note __ at n.15 (noting that courts had historically given the Service discretion 
whether or not to pay a whistleblower award and how much such award should be). See also Dennis J. 
Ventry, Whistleblowers and Qui Tam for Tax, 61 TAX LAW. 357, 362 (2008) (discussing the prior law to 
determine awards based on the discretion of the District Director); Davis-Nozemack and Webber, 
supra note __ at 83 (explaining that the codification of I.R.C. § 7623 authorized a discretionary payout 
system). 
58  Currently, the Service’s discretion is limited to small whistleblower awards that fall below the 
minimum dollar thresholds. See I.R.C. § 7623(a) (“The Secretary, under regulations prescribed by the 
Secretary, is authorized to pay such sums as he deems necessary for (1) detecting underpayments of tax, or 
(2) detecting and bringing to trial and punishment persons guilty of violating the internal revenue laws or 
conniving at the same, in cases where such expenses are not otherwise provided for by law.”). See also 
INTERNAL REV. SERV., Internal Revenue Code IRC 7623(a), http://www.irs.gov/uac/Internal-Revenue-
Code-IRC-7623(a), (“The award is at the discretion of the Service; there is no requirement that an award be 
issued; The discretionary award is based on additions to tax, penalties, and other amounts collected as a 
result of administrative or judicial action resulting from the information provided. No minimum statutory 
award percentage; No appeal provisions.”) 
59 See Davis-Nozemack and Webber, supra note __ at 87 (commenting on the 2006 changes to the 
Whistleblower Program as providing some certainty for award valuations that was not present under the 
prior discretionary system that still exists in section 7623(a)). 
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$2,000,000 or more.60 Congress also removed the prior $10 million award cap in an 
attempt to attract whistleblowers to report large tax evasion and fraud.61 Congress 
combined a high threshold for tax whistleblower claims with much needed award 
certainty to focus the Program on high dollar tax abuse cases.62  Congress intended the 
result to be a Whistleblower Program that seeks maximum revenues with minimal 
program expenses.63   
 
The certainty provided to whistleblowers under the 2006 statutory changes only exists 
on the surface, however.  In execution, the Whistleblower Program offers little certainty 
to whistleblowers.  
 
B.  Lifecycle of a Whistleblower Tip 
 
The Service has created a process for managing whistleblower tips and resulting 
taxpayer examinations or investigations.  In theory, this approach involves a detailed plan 
for processing the whistleblower tips with set processing time guidelines.  Unfortunately, 
the Service’s implementation of this plan has been heavily criticized for 
underperformance.   
 
1. Whistleblower Tips in Theory 
 
 The Service’s process for administering whistleblower claims is outlined in detail in 
the Internal Revenue Manual (IRM).64 Exhaustive detail is not needed for the purposes of 
this article.  What is important, however, is an understanding of the basic processing of a 
tax whistleblower tip.  
 
 Whistleblowers must submit tips in writing to the Service’s Whistleblower Office.65  
Once the Whistleblower Office completes an administrative and cursory substantive 
review of the tip, the tip is sent to the Service’s relevant operating division for a 
comprehensive substantive evaluation.66  The operating division has complete discretion 
over the process.67   The division may or may not debrief a whistleblower,68 and it may or 
                                                
60 See I.R.C. § 7623(b)(1) (“an award at least 15 percent but not more than 30 percent of the collected 
proceeds (including penalties, interest, additions to tax, and additional amounts) resulting from the action 
(including any related actions) or from any settlement in response to such action”). 
61 See Blake Ellis, Rat Out a Tax Cheat, Collect a Reward, CNNMONEY.COM (Mar, 3, 2010) (quoting 
Stephen Whitlock as stating that “many claims are for substantially more than the $2 million threshold and 
involve businesses or very wealthy individuals.”). 
62 See Tom Herman, Tipster Rewards Require Patience, WALL ST. J., Dec. 26, 2007, at D3 
(observing that Congress intended the promise of larger rewards would attract better quality tips and help 
reduce the tax gap).   
63 See Davis-Nozemack and Webber, supra note __ at 87. 
64 See I.R.M. 25.2.2.1 et seq.  
65 See I.R.M. 25.2.2.3, Submission of Information for Award under Sections 7623(a) or (b) (as 
amended Jun. 18, 2010).  
66 See I.R.M. 25.2.2.4, Initial Review of the Form 211 by the Whistleblower Office (as amended Jun. 
18, 2010).  
 67  Upon initial review, the whistleblower analyst may forward the submission to the criminal 
investigation division. See I.R.M. 25.2.2.7(2) and (3), Processing of the Form 211 7623(b) Claim for 
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may not act on the tip by beginning (or continuing) an examination of the taxpayer’s 
return(s).69 Only after tax proceeds have been collected and the two-year refund statute of 
limitations has run 70  will the Whistleblower Office evaluate the whistleblower’s 
contribution and pay an award.71 For many reasons, not the least of which is that a tax 
whistleblower may only be compensated from proceeds that the Service actually collects 
from the taxpayer, 72  the process may take the better part of a decade for a 
whistleblower.73   
 
2. Whistleblower Tips In Practice – Cultural Resistance and Processing Burdens 
 
Whistleblower attorneys have complained about the lengthy process and specifically 
about processing delays.74  At least one current tip has spent over six years under 
examination.75  Lengthy processing times could be due to the complexity of some cases, 
but they are exacerbated by the Service’s current incentive structure and cultural bias 
against aggressively pursuing whistleblower cases.76  The Service’s operating divisions 
have total discretion to act to upon any whistleblower tip.77  In other words, the division 
                                                                                                                                            
Award (as amended Jun. 18, 2010). If the tip is not used for a criminal investigation, the Operating Division 
applicable to the taxpayer reviews it for use. For example, a tip involving a small employer would be 
referred to the Small Business/Self-Employed division, whereas a tip involving a larger employer or a 
multi-national corporation would be referred to Large Business and International division. See I.R.M. 
25.2.2.6(4) and (6), Processing of the Form 211 7623(a) Claim for Award (as amended Jun. 18, 2010); 
I.R.M. 25.2.2.7(2) and (5), Processing of the Form 211 7623(b) Claim for Award (as amended Jun. 18, 
2010). 
68 See I.R.M. 25.2.2.6(10) and (11), Processing of the Form 211 7623(a) Claim for Award (as amended 
Jun. 18, 2010); I.R.M. 25.2.2.7(7) and (10), Processing of the Form 211 7623(b) Claim for Award (as 
amended Jun. 18, 2010) (noting that a debriefing will take place “[u]nless the SME determines that a 
debriefing is unlikely to result in information that would be material to the evaluation of the submission, 
the SME will debrief the whistleblower.”). See also Dalrymple Memo, supra note __ (requiring only that 
LB&I, TEGE, and SBSE provide a reason for failing to debrief).  
69 See I.R.M. 25.2.2.6(13) – (15), Processing of the Form 211 7623(a) Claim for Award (as amended 
Jun. 18, 2010). 
70 The payor of the tax proceeds may waive the right to a refund or settle, eliminating the need for the 
two-year window. See I.R.M. 25.2.2.1(6), Overview: Authority and Policy (as amended Jun. 18, 2010). 
71 See I.R.M. 25.2.2.6(14) through (20), Processing of the Form 211 7623(a) Claim for Award (as 
amended Jun. 18, 2010); I.R.M. 25.2.2.7(16) through (18), Processing of the Form 211 7623(b) Claim for 
Award (as amended Jun. 18, 2010); I.R.M. 25.2.2.8, Whistleblower Award Administrative Proceeding (as 
amended Jun. 18, 2010); I.R.M. 25.2.2.9, Award Computation (as amended Jun. 18, 2010); I.R.M. 
25.2.2.12, Funding Awards (as amended Jun. 18, 2010).  
72 See I.R.C. § 7623(b)(1) (“such individual shall…receive as an award at least 15 percent but not more 
than 30 percent of the collected proceeds ….”). 
73 See Morse, supra note __ at 11-13.  See also Jesse Drucker and Peter S. Green, IRS Resists Whistle-
Blowers Despite Wide U.S. Tax Gap, BLOOMBERG (Jun. 19, 2012), available at 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-06-19/irs-resists-whistleblowers-despite-wide-u-s-tax-gap.html. 
74 See infra n. _ -__.   
75 See WHISTLEBLOWER OFFICE, FY 2013 REPORT, supra note __ at tbl 5. 
76 See Jeremiah Coder, IRS Whistleblower Office Making Improvements, TAX NOTES (Feb. 27, 2012) 
(quoting Whitlock as stating “the audit process for high-dollar cases takes longer, given their complexities 
and the opportunities for taxpayers to appeal.”). 
77 See Jeremiah Coder, The Whistleblower Whipsaw Process, TAX NOTES (Mar. 11, 2013) (noting that 
the Service determines whether or not it will act on a tip from a whistleblower and whistleblowers do not 
have a path to appeal if their information is ignored). 
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can choose to ignore a tip. Even if a tip is accepted, the Service does not give 
whistleblower cases any higher priority. Agents have no greater incentive to act upon 
whistleblower cases than other cases.78 Whistleblower cases are not a policy priority and 
may encounter cultural resistance within the Service.79  While recent Service executives 
have expressed support for the whistleblower program,80 previous Service executives 
have publicly expressed disdain for the program.81 The Service has a long-standing 
closed-door policy with respect to its examinations and has limited involvement from 
non-Service individuals. 82   The presence of a whistleblower changes this cultural 
dynamic by adding an “outsider” into an examination.  As society has embraced 
whistleblowers, the Service has not yet caught up culturally.  
 
The Program has recently received significantly more tips but has struggled to 
process them.83 The whistleblower process itself has additional steps in comparison to 
                                                
78 Andrew Velarde, ‘Miller Memo’ Seen as Improving IRS Whistleblower Process, TAX NOTES (Oct. 7, 
2013) (quoting Harvey as saying “There needs to be a lot of thinking about how you provide incentives to 
the field agents to take the whistleblower information, ‘maybe in a situation where they already know about 
a particular issue, but they don’t have the proverbial smoking gun,’ he said. ‘There may be some 
institutional bias at the lower levels of the IRS.’”). 
79 See Erika Kelton, IRS Cheats Taxpayers By Ignoring Whistleblowers, FORBES (Apr. 4, 2014) (noting 
that “The root of the problem is the anti-whistleblower attitude ingrained in the IRS culture- a status quo 
that no IRS commissioner has attempted to change…”); Erika Kelton, IRS Whistleblowers See Little 
Reward, FORBES (Mar. 2, 2012) (noting that “…the IRS Whistleblower Office does its best but faces stiff 
headwinds form the IRS Office of Chief Counsel (OCC), which has stymied the whistleblower program by 
interpreting the 2006 law in ways that discourage whistleblowers and undermine the program’s potential 
for success”); Jeremiah Coder, GAO Faults IRS Whistleblower Program for Award Delays, TAX NOTES 
(Sept. 19, 2011) (quoting Knott, Zerbe, Grassley, and Skarlatos remarking on cultural resistance to working 
whistleblowers).  
80 See Douglas Shulman, Remarks Before 21st Annual George Washington University International 
Tax Conference (Dec. 8, 2008), available at http://www.irs.gov/uac/Remarks-of-Commissioner-Douglas-
Shulman-before-the-21st-Annual-George-Washington-University-International-Tax-Conference (“Using 
informants is another part of our toolkit. . . . Some of these have become big money cases.”).  See also Paul 
Bonner, Tax From the Top: Q&A With IRS Commissioner Doug Shulman, J. ACCT. (Apr. 2010) (quoting 
Shulman as stating “It’s still relatively new but an important tool for tax administration. . . .  But I’m a big 
fan of the program. It can help us identify fraud or tax noncompliance we would have never known 
about.”), http://www.journalofaccountancy.com/issues/2010/apr/20102509.htm. See also Gretchen 
Morgensen, Sounding the Tax Alarm, to Little Applause N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 8, 2014) (stating Commissioner 
Koskinen was a “fan” of the whistleblower program and stressing the importance of a tax system where 
everyone is paying their share).  
81 See Jeremiah Coder, Conversations: Donald Korb, TAX NOTES (Jan. 19, 2010) (quoting Korb as 
stating “The new whistle-blower provisions Congress enacted a couple of years ago have the potential to be 
a real disaster for the tax system. I believe that it is unseemly in this country to encourage people to turn in 
their neighbors and employers to the IRS as contemplated by this particular program. The IRS didn't ask for 
these rules; they were forced on it by the Congress.”). 
82 See Awards for Information Relating to Detecting Underpayments of Tax or Violations of the 
Internal Revenue Laws: Public Hearing on Proposed Regulation 26 C.F.R. Part 301 (Apr. 10, 2013) 
[hereinafter 2013 Public Hearing on Proposed Regulations] (testimony of Erica Brady, noting the Service 
has been plagued by criticism that the Service does not welcome whistleblowers, and testimony of Tom 
Pliske, acknowledging the Service is constrained by privacy limitations and therefore does not disclose 
taxpayer information).   
83 See Davis-Nozemack and Webber, supra note ___ at 89-93 (noting the TIGTA and GAO reports 
regarding IRS Whistleblower Office struggles).   
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non-whistleblower examinations, 84 and consequently examinations involving 
whistleblowers may experiences delays that non-whistleblower cases do not. For 
example, whistleblower cases must spend time in the whistleblower office for screening 
and referral, then with a subject matter expert, and also may undergo a review by chief 
counsel’s office for privileged documents or other issues.85 
 
During the last year, the whistleblower office and some areas of the Service have 
improved the processing time for tips; however, tips still spend an inordinate amount of 
time in process overall.86 Many whistleblower attorneys complain that delay is often 
caused during a tip’s time with subject matter experts and chief counsel’s office.87 Tips 
are with a subject matter expert for evaluation for more than six months (on average), and 
one currently open tip has spent over three years with a subject matter expert.88  A 
whistleblower attorney has reported that delays of more than a year are common for tips 
undergoing subject matter expert evaluation.89  
 
It is unclear whether additional time for these functions results in a more efficient 
examination.  It is clear that the administrative procedures overburden the Whistleblower 
Program. Delays, with which the program appears peppered, create the danger of statute 
of limitations expiration.90 If whistleblowers perceive tip processing is prolonged, there is 
                                                
84 See Jeremiah Coder, GAO Faults IRS Whistleblower Program for Award Delays, TAX NOTES (Sept. 
19, 2011) (acknowledging that “the demands on subject matter experts’ time, review of information for 
applicable privilege, and arranging debriefings with whistleblowers all add to how long a claim may be in 
process”). 
85 See id. 
86 Compare WHISTLEBLOWER OFFICE, FY 2013 REPORT, at tbl 5, with WHISTLEBLOWER OFFICE, FY 
2012 REPORT at tbl 3. See also Press Release from Senator Charles Grassley (Jun. 21, 2012) [hereinafter 
Grassley 2012 Press Release] (discussing the Service’s acknowledgment of lengthy processing of 
whistleblower claims). 
87 See Jeremiah Coder, Strong IRS Headwind Blows Whistleblowers Off Course, TAX NOTES (May 21, 
2012) (quoting one practitioner as stating “’There are nice people running the IRS Whistleblower Office, 
but no one seems to want to make hard decisions and ruffle feathers of those in chief counsel or other parts 
of the IRS opposed to the program.’”); Jeremiah Coder, GAO Faults IRS, supra note __ (quoting Lynam as 
stating “’the IRS’s use of subject matter experts has been inefficient in evaluating whistleblower claims.”). 
88 See WHISTLEBLOWER OFFICE, FY 2013 REPORT at tbl 5 (the text accompanying table 5 notes that the 
“data collection . . . did not consider the possibility that a claim may not move through the process linearly. 
For example, the claim reported as “longest” in operating division subject matter expert status was 
transferred for consideration of a field examination after completion of a criminal investigation.” 
Nonetheless, the report includes no information about the tip that spent the longest “linear” time in the 
process.) 
89  See Jeremiah Coder, Strong IRS Headwind Blows, supra note __ (quoting Lynam as stating “’When 
I asked a subject matter expert why it took so long to get the debrief meeting set up, his response was ‘This 
has only been on my desk for a year,’’ Lynam said, adding that the answer ‘boggles the mind.  It shouldn’t 
take multiple years to determine whether a submission has merit,’ he said.’”).   
90 Jeremiah Coder, Strong IRS Headwind Blows, supra note __ (commenting that whistleblower 
advocates and their clients are unhappy with the lack of set deadlines for Service response times in the 
whistleblower statutes); Jeremiah Coder, GAO Faults IRS, supra note __ (quoting Lynam as stating “’No 
one needs three years to determine if a case could be valid.  In point of pact, waiting three years pretty 
much ensures that it won’t be because the statute of limitations would have expired,’ Lynam said. ‘If a 
revenue agent lets the statute of limitations run on an exam, there would be significant consequences, 
including potential job termination.  But if the subject matter expert or chief counsel employee lets the 
statute of limitations run, it is just another day at the office.’”). 
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a risk that whistleblowers will not step forward and submit tips. There have been a 
number of calls for revisions to the IRS Whistleblower Program,91 and the Service has 
publicly acknowledged the Program “isn’t where we would like it yet.”92  
 
C.  Service’s Approach to Debriefing 
 
One of the places ripe for revision is in whistleblower information intake. Currently, 
the Service accepts only written tips.93 Without interviewing a whistleblower, the Service 
has only written statements and submitted documents with which to work. Relying solely 
on written submissions unnecessarily limits the Service’s access to information about the 
taxpayer and the whistleblower. Debriefing, otherwise known as interviewing, can allow 
the Service to better ascertain the veracity of the whistleblower and any motivations for 
tip submission.  In addition, debriefing allows the Service to explicitly explore the 
relationship between the whistleblower and taxpayer to flesh out any potential legal 
issues related to tip receipt.  Specifically, privilege, Fourth and Sixth Amendment pose 
potential issues but are not likely to be identified by the written submission.   Debriefing 
also serves as a way for the whistleblower to provide expert-like guidance to the Service 
as it examines sophisticated business transactions.   
 
For the past six years, the Service’s policy for interviewing whistleblowers has been 
in flux. Prior to 2008, the Service did not have any policy expressly governing  
                                                
91 See e.g., Press Release from Senator Charles Grassley (Sept. 9, 2011) 2011 Tax Notes Today 176-60 
[hereinafter Grassley 2011 Press Release] (advocating for suggestions recommended by a GAO report on 
the Whistleblower Program); Letter from Senator Charles Grassley, U.S. Senate, to Douglas Shulman, 
Commissioner, Internal Revenue Serv. (Sept. 13, 2011), available at 
http://www.rewardtax.com/files/grassleylettertoshulman9_13_11.pdf [hereinafter Grassley Letter to 
Shulman] (arguing that funds received from whistleblower tips can more than pay for improvements 
necessary for the Program to grow in its success); Letter from Senator Charles Grassley, U.S. Senate, to 
Douglas Shulman, Commissioner, Internal Revenue Serv.,  & Timothy Geithner, Secretary, Dep’t of 
Treasury, (Apr. 30, 2012), available at http://www.grassley.senate.gov/about/upload/Document_.pdf 
[hereinafter Grassley Letter to Shulman and Geithner] (reiterating his concerns that the Service is not 
implementing recommendations from the GAO although the Service has access to funds to do so); Grassley 
2012 Press Release, (requesting an accounting from the Commissioner of the IRS regarding flawed 
implementation of the IRS Whistleblower Program) available at http://www.grassley.senate.gov/news/; 
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-11-683, TAX WHISTLEBLOWERS: INCOMPLETE DATA HINDERS 
IRS’S ABILITY TO MANAGE CLAIM PROCESSING TIME AND ENHANCE EXTERNAL COMMUNICATION (Aug. 
2011) at 26 [hereinafter 2011 GAO Report] (listing recommendations for executive action to improve the 
processing of whistleblower claims); Erika Kelton, IRS Whistleblowers Should See New Tone at the Top, 
FORBES (Oct. 11, 2012) http://www.forbes.com/sites/erikakelton/2012/10/11/irs-whistleblowers-should-
see-new-tone-at-the-top/ (discussing the lack of attention the Whistleblower Program was receiving from 
the former head of the Service and a change in leadership at the Service could improve the Service’s 
Whistleblower Program). 
92See Tom Schoenberg & David Voreacos, UBS Whistle-Blower Secures $104 Million Award from 
IRS, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 11, 2012). http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-09-11/ubs-whistle-blower-
birkenfeld-secures-irs-award-lawyers-say.html (citing 2012 interview with IRS Deputy Commissioner for 
Services and Enforcement Steven Miller).   
93 See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., FORM 211, APPLICATION FOR AWARD FOR ORIGINAL INFORMATION 
(2014), http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/f211.pdf.  See also INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., FORM 3949-A, 
INFORMATION REFERRAL (2014), http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/f3949a.pdf. 
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interviews with whistleblowers.94 In 2008, the Service’s policy, as announced by Chief 
Counsel Notice, 95 articulated a “one bite rule.”96 The policy limited staff to a single 
interview and document collection from an employee whistleblower.97  The Notice 
reasoned that, if the government was a “passive recipient of information and did not 
encourage or acquiesce” in a whistleblower’s conduct, then the government would be 
able to use a whistleblower’s information and any of the fruits of that information without 
tainting it.98   
 
Two years later, the Service amended its 2008 Notice for civil tax matters.99  
Arguably, the Service continued its 2008 “one bite rule” with respect to criminal 
matters.100  In the revised 2010 Notice, the Service continued to suggest that it remain a 
passive recipient of information;101 however, the Service added a very brief analysis of 
applicable Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.102 The Service included a two-factor test103 
for determining whether a private party’s search would be imputed to the government, 
and subsequently barred by the exclusion rule.104  While the added legal analysis 
                                                
94 The authors could find no published Service policy relating to whistleblower interviews issued 
before 2008.  
95 See Office of Chief Counsel Notice, CC-2008-011, Limitations on Informant Contacts: Current 
Employees and Taxpayer Representatives, (Feb. 27, 2008) at 1-2.  
96 Although the Chief Counsel’s Office expressed the one bite rule policy, the 2008 Internal Revenue 
Manual (IRM) contained a broader policy.  It contemplated that the Service “will debrief a whistleblower” 
in § 7623(b) claims “unless the [Subject Matter Expert] determines that a debriefing is unlikely to result in 
information that would be material to the evaluation of the submission.” See I.R.M. 25.2.2.6(5) Processing 
Form 211 7623(b) Claim for Award (as amended Dec. 30, 2008). Although the Service circulated two 
different policies during this time period, it appears, based on whistleblower attorneys’ statements during 
this time, that the Service was using the one bite policy. See Janet Novack and William P. Barnett, Tax 
Informants are on the Loose, FORBES (Nov. 24, 2009) 
http://www.forbes.com/forbes/2009/1214/investment-guide-10-ubs-irs-spondello-tax-informants-on-
loose.html (“One big issue in this case is the so-called one-bite rule, an IRS directive that says the agency 
can be a one-time passive recipient of documents an informant brings from a target but can’t have him go 
back and take more documents.”). See also Michael Hudson, Red Tape, Old Guard Slow Whistleblowing on 
Corporate Tax Cheats, TUSCON SENTINEL (Jun. 22, 2011) 
http://www.tucsonsentinel.com/nationworld/report/062211_irs_whistleblowers/red-tape-old-guard-slow-
whistleblowing-corporate-tax-cheats/ (quoting Erika Kelton as stating “One stalled case . . . involves 
hundreds of millions of dollars in tax cheating by a Wall Street bank . . .. The case is stuck in some review 
process, and it’s been like that for two years even though the whistleblower has offered further help. He 
could help them break through some of the issues in a 45-minute meeting. But the IRS has refused to meet 
with him.”). 
97 See id. 
98 Id. While the Notice permitted one time only contact with employee whistleblowers, the Notice 
completely barred the receipt of any information from whistleblowers who represented the taxpayer before 
the Service or in litigation in which the Service has an interest. See id. at 2. 
99  See Office of Chief Counsel Notice, CC-2010-004, Clarification of CC Notice 2008-011 - 
Limitations on Informant Contacts: Current Employees and Taxpayer Representatives, (Feb. 17, 2010) at 2. 
100 See id. at 1 (addressing policy with respect to civil matters only).  
101 See id. at 2. 
102 See id. at 1-2. 
103  See id (“Generally, courts focus on two factors: (1) the government's knowledge of, and 
acquiescence in, the search and seizure, and (2) the intent of the party conducting the search and seizure. 
(citing United States v. Walther, 652 F.2d 788 (9th Cir. 1981))). 
104 See id.  
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undoubtedly helps Service personnel in understanding the issues and stakes of 
whistleblower interviews, the most important change of the Notice was a slight loosening 
of the “one bite rule” for employee whistleblowers.105  Instead of nearly wholesale 
prohibition on subsequent whistleblower contact, the Service expressly allowed an 
employee whistleblower to submit supplemental information if it was for the “sole 
purpose of clarifying previously submitted information” and “reasonably relate[s] to the 
previously submitted information.”106  The Service would consider any new information 
from an employee whistleblower that related to a new issue as a new whistleblower 
claim.107 Despite the permissive language for whistleblower contact within the 2010 
Notice, the Notice’s tone still dissuaded communication with whistleblowers and warned 
Service employees about contact with whistleblowers.  While the 2010 Notice appears, 
on its face, to slightly liberalize whistleblower contact policy, greater whistleblower 
communication does not appear to have happened in practice.108   
 
The 2010 Internal Revenue Manual (“IRM”)109 added a “Debriefing Checksheet,”110 
but it fails to live up to its title. The Checksheet seeks to ensure that the veracity and 
voluntary provision of the whistleblower’s information. 111   It also warns the 
whistleblower that the Service may not use the information, but if it does, the issue may 
take years to resolve, and that any award is taxable.112  Finally, the Checksheet promises 
confidentiality for the whistleblower’s identity.  This Checksheet essentially serves the 
purpose of legal protection for the Whistleblower Program.   The Debriefing Checksheet 
provides nothing other than a legal coverage to the Service in the event of a dispute with 
the whistleblower on any of the above-mentioned issues.  It provides very little 
investigative assistance.  
 
 During the following two years, the Service received correspondence critical of the 
Whistleblower Program from Senator Charles Grassley.113  His criticism centered on the 
Service’s policies and procedures for consuming whistleblowers tips.114  Perhaps due to 
                                                
105 See id. at 2. 
106 Id. 
107 See id. at 3. The Service’s prohibition against accepting tips from taxpayer representatives remained 
the same. See id. 
108 See Druker and Green, supra note __ (stating that the IRS is reluctant to talk directly to 
whistleblowers.).  See also Erika Kelton, IRS Whistleblowers See Little Reward, FORBES (Mar. 2, 2012) 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/erikakelton/2012/03/02/irs-whistleblowers-see-little-reward/ (acknowledging 
the frustration of whistleblowers that the Service has not utilized the whistleblowers’ expertise and allowed 
the whistleblowers to assist in a limited role in the investigation).  
109 Chief Counsel amended its whistleblower debriefing policy in 2010, and another version of the 
IRM whistleblower provisions were also adopted. Similar to the 2008 version, the 2010 IRM contemplated 
debriefing whistleblowers, stating “[u]nless the examiner/team determines that a debriefing is unlikely to 
result in information that would be material to the evaluation of the submission, the examiner/team will 
debrief the whistleblower.” I.R.M. 25.2.2.6(10) Processing of the Form 211 7623(b) Claim for Award, (as 
amended Jun. 18, 2010).    
110 See I.R.M. Exhibit 25.2.2-4 Debriefing Checksheet (as amended Jun. 18, 2010). 
111 See id.   
112 See id.   
113 See Grassley Letter to Shulman, supra note __; Grassely Letter to Shulman and Geithner, supra 
note __; Grassley 2011 Press Release, supra note __; Grassley 2012 Press Release, supra note __.   
114 See id.  
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this criticism, the Deputy Commissioner for Services and Enforcement distributed a 
memo encouraging Service personnel to accept and use whistleblower tips.115 In a June 
2012 memo, the Deputy Commissioner expressed an “expectation that debriefing will be 
the rule not the exception.”116  He reasoned that “debriefing [a whistleblower]  . . . is an 
important component of the evaluation of whistleblower information prior to a decision 
on whether the information should be referred to the field for audit or investigation.”117  
This memo appears to mark a policy shift for the Service’s interaction with 
whistleblowers. Unlike previous Chief Counsel Notices, the memo made no distinctions 
between non-employee whistleblowers, employee whistleblowers, or taxpayer 
representatives.  Indeed, the memo lacked any specificity whatsoever.  It appears to be a 
blanket statement of intention.118   
 
In August 2014, a new Deputy Commissioner issued a strong statement in favor of 
debriefing, but it too lacked specificity on the use of debriefing.119  The recent Memo 
uses mandatory language, “all whistleblower submission referred for subject matter 
expert (SME) review  . . . will include debriefing of the whistleblower”; however, there is 
only a nominal enforcement mechanism.  The failure to debrief merely requires 
documentation of the reasoning for declining a debriefing.120   
 
While the 2012 and 2014 Memos are steps toward more debriefing, the Service has 
left its personnel without any guidance for implementing the Memos’ good intentions. 
Without specificity and guidance, the Service risks falling back into cultural reluctance to 
debriefing whistleblowers.  A general reluctance to engage with third parties may be 
well-suited for typical examinations and helpful for protecting taxpayer privacy; 
however, whistleblower involvement necessitates another approach.  In particular, the 
Service should be more willing to take a critical look at its debriefing policies.    
 
III. PERCEIVED OBSTACLES TO WHISTLEBLOWER DEBRIEFING 
  
When the Service receives a whistleblower tip, the Service cannot simply open a 
dialogue amongst all of the parties.  The Service is required by statute to protect 
taxpayer’s privacy, 121  and the Service also recognizes that it should protect a 
whistleblower’s anonymity. 122   The Service must also respect a taxpayer’s Fourth 
                                                
115 See Miller Memo supra note __.  
116 See id. 
117 See id.  
118 Nonetheless, the Deputy Commissioner’s statement appears to temporally correlate with a change 
in Service action. Compare id (issued on June 20, 2012), with 2013 Public Hearing on Proposed 
Regulations (statement of Scott Oswald) (“And so in the interviews we’ve had with IRS examiners, when 
its gone into enforcement, its really this one-way type of conversation, and these have occurred, I think, 
with some regularity, since July.”). A whistleblower attorney’s testimony indicates that the Service has 
been debriefing more whistleblowers recently; the testimony also implied that debriefing increased after the 
2012 Memo. See 2013 Public Hearing on Proposed Regulations, supra note __. 
119 See Dalrymple Memo, supra note __. 
120 See id. (“or a specific justification for a decision not to conduct a debriefing.” 
121 I.R.C. §6103 
122 See I.R.M. 25.2.2.11(1), Confidentiality of the Whistleblower (as amended Jun. 18, 2010) (“The 
IRS will protect the identity of the whistleblower to the fullest extent permitted by the law.”); See also 
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Amendment right against unreasonable search and seizure. These requirements may 
appear to constrain the Service; however, a closer examination reveals the circumstances 
of their invocation to be a rare occurrence in civil tax matters.  The reality is that these 
issues are navigable for the Service.   
 
A.  Fourth Amendment Implications in Whistleblower Debriefing 
 
The following analyzes the legal framework, consequences and likelihood of 
violating a taxpayer’s Fourth Amendment rights.   
 
1. The Fourth Amendment Applies Only to Governmental Searches 
 
As a federal agency, the Service must respect a taxpayer’s constitutional rights, 
including a taxpayer’s Fourth Amendment rights against unreasonable search and 
seizure.123  The Fourth Amendment states that “[t]he right of the people to be secure in 
their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, 
shall not be violated . . ..”124 
 
While the Fourth Amendment provides protection for the expectation of privacy that 
society has established for both individuals and businesses,125 the Fourth Amendment has 
limited applicability to whistleblowers.  It only prohibits taxpayers from unreasonable 
search and seizure by the government.126 Fourth Amendment protection of a person’s 
privacy does not extend protection against search and seizure by private individuals.127  
Other laws protect against privacy violations such as trespass, burglary, and 
eavesdropping by private individuals.   
                                                                                                                                            
Kwon, supra note 21 at n.312 (2010) (citing I.R.S. Notice 2008-4, 2008-2 I.R.B. 253, § 3.06; Roviaro v. 
United States, 353 U.S. 53, 59 (1957); Weimerskirch v. Commissioner, 67 T.C. 672, 676 (1977), rev'd on 
other grounds, 596 F.2d 358 (9th Cir. 1979) (stating that the informer privilege permits the government to 
withhold the identity of ‘persons who furnish information of violation of law to officers charged with 
enforcement of that law’ to encourage the flow of information to the government)). 
123 See Marshall v. Barlow’s Inc., 436 U.S. 307 (1978) (noting that businesses, like individuals, have 
Fourth Amendment rights (citing See v. Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 543 (1967))).  See also United States v. 
Blocker, 104 F.3d 720, 726 (5th Cir. 1997). 
124 U.S. CONST., amend. IV. 
125 See United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984) (noting the expectation of privacy (citing 
Illinois v. Andreas, 463 U.S. 765, 771 (1983); U.S. v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 280-1 (1983); Smith v. 
Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 739-41 (1979); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968))).  See also See Marshall, 436 
U.S. at 307 (noting that businesses, like individuals, have Fourth Amendment rights (citing See v. Seattle, 
387 U.S. 541, 543 (1967))). 
126 See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350 (1967) (“The amendment protects individual privacy 
against certain kinds of governmental intrusion . . ..”). As the Supreme Court made clear in 1921, the 
Fourth Amendment does not limit search and seizure by anyone other than the government.   See Burdeau v 
McDowell, 256 U.S. 465, 475 (1921) (stating “The Fourth Amendment gives protection against unlawful 
searches and seizures, and as shown in the previous cases, its protection applies to governmental action. Its 
origin and history clearly show that it was intended as a restraint upon the activities of sovereign authority, 
and was not intended to be a limitation upon other than governmental agencies; as against such authority it 
was the purpose of the Fourth Amendment to secure the citizen in the right of unmolested occupation of his 
dwelling and the possession of his property, subject to the right of seizure by process duly issued.”). 
127 See Katz, 389 U.S. at 350. 
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Generally, a whistleblower may give another’s information or property to the 
government without implicating the Fourth Amendment.  Many individuals do not 
appreciate the possibility that a confidant may disclose his or her secrets or give his or her 
property to the government.  When confiding in another, a person “assumes the risk that 
his confidant will reveal that information to the authorities . . ..”128  Breach of confidence 
is not protected by the Fourth Amendment.129  This is true even if the information was 
shared only for limited purposes and with the assumption that the information would 
remain confidential.130    
 
2. An Exception for Governmental Instruments 
 
  As a private party, the whistleblower may violate the Fourth Amendment if the 
whistleblower is regarded as having acted as an ‘instrument’ or agent of the state . . ..”131  
When an individual is an instrument of the government, the individual’s actions are 
credited to the government.  With this exception, an unreasonable search by a private 
individual, which would ordinarily not implicate the Fourth Amendment, becomes an 
unreasonable search by the government.  
 
a. The Two-Factor Test  
  
The Supreme Court has stated that “whether a private party should be deemed an 
agent or instrument of the government for Fourth Amendment purposes necessarily turns 
on the degree of the Government’s participation in the private party’s activities.”132  The 
Supreme Court resolves the question of governmental agency or instrumentality in light 
of all the circumstances,133 and it has offered no bright line test.134  Because the issue is 
so fact determinative, Courts’ of Appeals analysis offers more instruction for determining 
a cohesive view. All but the Second, Third and Federal circuits have utilized a two-factor 
test to determine whether a whistleblower is a government instrument.135  The first factor 
                                                
128 See Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 117.  See also Matthew D. Lawless, The Third Party Doctrine Redux: 
Internet Search Records and the Case for a ‘Crazy Quilt’ of Fourth Amendment Protection, 2007 U.C.L.A. 
J. L. & TECH. 2, 9 (2007) (citing Daniel J. Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 477, 528 
(2006), Phillip H. Marcus, A Fourth Amendment Gag Order – Upholding Third Party Searches at the 
Expense of First Amendment Freedom of Association Guarantees, 47. U. PITT. L. REV. 257, 276 (1985)). 
129 See Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 117. See also Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 488 (1971) (the 
Fourth Amendment does not “discourage citizens from aiding to the utmost of their ability in the 
apprehension of criminals.”) . 
130 See Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 117.  See also Lawless, supra note __ at 9 (citing United States v. Miller, 
425 U.S. 435, 442 (1976)); Marcus, supra note __ at 276. 
131 Id. 
132 Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 614 (1989) (comparing Lustig v. United 
States, 338 U.S. 74, 78-79 (1949), Byars v. United States, 273 U.S. 28, 32-33 (1927)). 
133 See id. at 614-15(citing Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 487). 
134 See United States v. Miller, 688 F.2d 652, 656-7 (9th Cir. 1982). 
135 See United States v. Pervaz, 118 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 1997) (internal citations omitted) (“ . . . two facts 
must be shown.  First, the police must have instigated, encouraged or participated in the search. Second, the 
individual must have engaged in the search with the intent of assisting the police in their investigative 
efforts.”).  United States v. Jarrett, 338 F.3d 339, 344-5 (4th Cir. 2003) (“the Courts of Appeals have 
identified two primary factors  . . .  are (1) whether the government knew of or acquiesced in the private 
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is whether the government knew or acquiesced in the private search.  The second factor is 
whether the searching party intended to be a government instrument.   
i. The First Factor 
 
In most circuits, the first factor examines the government’s acquiescence or 
knowledge of the search. 136  These circuits examine whether law enforcement has 
“instigated, encouraged, or participated in the search”137 to determine “if the government 
coerces, dominates, or directs the actions of a private person’ conducting the search . . 
..”138  In looking at government participation under the first factor, courts have allowed 
the presence 139  and limited involvement 140  of law enforcement, particularly when 
government involvement came after the initial private discovery.141  Courts have even 
                                                                                                                                            
search, and (2) whether the private individual intended to assist law enforcement efforts or to had some 
other independent motivation.  . . .  We too have embraced this two-factor approach, which we have 
compressed into ‘one highly pertinent consideration.’”).  United States v. Paige, 136 F.3d 1012, 1017-8 (5th 
Cir. 1998) (“There is no indication from the record (1) that the government knew of or acquiesced in the 
intrusive conduct of Willard and Windell, and (2) that Willard and Windell intended to assist law 
enforcement efforts in conducting their search.” (citing U.S. v. Blocker, 104 F.3d 720, 725 (5th Cir. 1997) 
and noting it is utilized the test in Miller)).  United States v. Lambert, 771 F.2d 83, 89 (6th Cir. 1985) (“ . . . 
two factors must be shown.  First, the police must have instigated, encouraged or participated in the search. 
Second, the individual must have engaged in the search with the intent of assisting the police in their 
investigative efforts.”). United States v. McAllister, 18 F.3d 1412, 1417 (7th Cir. 1994) (“Initially, we 
determine ‘whether the government knew of or acquiesced in the intrusive conduct,’ and secondly ‘whether 
the private party’s purpose  . . . was to assist law enforcement efforts or to further his own ends.”). United 
States v. Malbrough, 922 F.2d 458, 462 (8th Cir. 1990) (citing United States v. Miller, 688 F.2d 652 (9th Cir. 
1982)) (“two critical factors are ‘whether the government knew of or acquiesced in the intrusive conduct,’ 
and ‘whether the party performing the search intended to assist law enforcement efforts or to further [the 
informant’s] own ends.’”). Miller, 688 F.2d at 657 (“ . . . we discerned that two critical factors in the 
‘instrument or agent analysis are (1) whether the government knew of or acquiesced in the intrusive 
conduct, and (2) whether the party performing the search intended to assist law enforcement efforts or to 
further his own ends.”).  United States v. Smythe, 84 F.3d 1240, 1242-3 (10th Cir 1996) (quoting Pleasant v. 
Lovell, 876 F.2d 787, 796 (10th Cir. 1989) (citing Miller, 688 F.2d at 657 (“two important inquiries to aid in 
the determination . . . are whether ‘the government knew of or acquiesced in the intrusive conduct, and . . . 
[whether] the party performing the search intended to assist law enforcement efforts or to further his own 
ends.”)). 
136 Id. The First and Sixth circuits use a slight variation of the first factor.  See Pervaz, 118 F.3d at 5; 
Lambert, 771 F.2d at 89. 
137 Id. 
138 Smythe, 84 F.3d at 1242. The Fourth circuit alone couches its analysis in terms of agency creation.  
Specifically, the circuit seeks to “determine whether the requisite agency relationship exists” through a 
“fact-intensive inquiry that is guided by common law agency principles.”  Jarrett, 338 F.3d at 344.  See 
also United States v. Day, 591 F.3d 679, 683 (4th Cir. 2010) (citing Jarrett, 338 F.3d at 344). 
139 See e.g., Smythe, 84 F.3d at 1242 (bus station manager receives suspicious package for shipment 
and summons policeman, who is present during manager’s opening of package); Miller, 688 F.2d at 652-4 
(FBI agent watched as witness conducted search of property).  
140 See e.g., United States v. Smith, 383 F.3d 700 (8th Cir. 2004) (police remove suspicious package 
from Federal Express conveyor belt and gives it to manager who then opens it); United States v. Hall, 142 
F.3d 988 (7th Cir. 1998) (after initial search by computer technician, trooper requests technician to copy 
found, illegal images but copy is never viewed by police or used as basis of later issued warrant);  
141 See e.g., United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109 (1984) (Federal Express discover white powder 
when examining a damaged package and summon DEA agent, who reopens the package and makes a field 
test without a warrant). 
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allowed small degrees of law enforcement assistance in the search.142  Courts have been 
skeptical, however, of ongoing contact or relationships between whistleblowers and the 
government. 143  Despite expressing skepticism, courts have allowed governmental 
involvement with only a thin veneer of a “wink and a nod.”144  In most published cases, 
courts permit the government very wide latitude in dealing with whistleblowers. 145  Even 
in cases with judicial admonishments, courts often find a way to admit the contested 
evidence.146   
 
While courts are skeptical of ongoing or lengthy relationships between 
whistleblowers and the government, the timing of the relationship can mitigate courts’ 
skepticism. 147   Even though courts prefer that private searches occur before contact with 
the government, it is not fatal that a prior search did not occur before the whistleblower’s 
contact with the government.148  Courts have given significant latitude to the government 
during a search, even going so far as to find a way to allow DEA agents to physically 
assist a private searcher in opening contraband.149   
                                                
142 See United States v. Souza, 223 F.3d 1197 (10th Cir. 2000) (DEA agents identified suspicious 
package at UPS facility, then encouraged employee to open it, and assisted with actual opening). 
143 See United States v. Barth, 26 F. Supp.2d 929 (W.D. Tex. 1998) (FBI confidential informant finds 
illegal images and then conducts additional searched after talking with law enforcement).  See also United 
States v. Jarrett, 338 F.3d 339, 343 (4th Cir. 2003) (The agent told the whistleblower/hacker that she could 
not ask him “to search out cases such as the ones you have sent us.  That would make you an agent of the 
Federal Government and make how you obtain your information illegal and we could not use it . . . But if 
you should happen across such [information]  . . . and wish us to look into the matter, please feel free to 
send them to us.” Despite characterizing the statements as a “wink and a nod,” the Court permitted the use 
of the information because the hacker’s actions did not rise to the level of a government agent.).    
144 Id. 
145  See United States v. Feffer, 831 F.2d 734, 739 (1987) (an employee gave records to the Service 
over a series of months and the agents arrived at one meeting with a “microfilm copier,” presumably ready 
to copy documents that they anticipated from the whistleblower, the Court of Appeals cautioned that the 
“IRS agents’ conduct came close to being improper.”). 
146 See id.  
147 See Jarrett, 338 F.3d. at 346 (citing United States v. Steiger, 318 F.3d 1039 (11th Cir. 2003)). In 
Jarrett, the hacker’s evidence was permitted only because the hacker who discovered illegal images on the 
defendant’s computer had conducted the illegal search prior to his lengthy email exchanges with an FBI 
agent. The Court focused on the timing of the relationship between the hacker and the FBI as a basis for 
deeming the search permissible; however, the Court ignored that the hacker had a prior relationship with 
the FBI that predated the case.  The hacker had been the primary informant in another case involving nearly 
the same conduct by both the hacker and the defendant, and the hacker had FBI contact during the prior 
case.   In an older Seventh Circuit case, an employee kept copies of her employer’s records and later gave 
them to the Service but the court focused on the fact that the employee’s search occurred prior to any 
contact with the Service’s agents).  See United States v. Harper, 458 F.2d 891 (1971) (“Indeed, the records 
were acquired eight months prior to her first contact with the agents.  In such a situation, the Fourth 
Amendment does not require that the evidence be excluded.”).  See also United States v. Ziperstein, 601 
F.2d 281, 289 (1979) (finding that employee had “gained possession of the documents before his contact 
with the FBI”). 
148 See United States v. Black, 767 F.2d 1334, 1339 (9th Cir. 1985) (noting that the government initiated 
contact prior to the whistleblower’s disclosure of the documents).   
149 See United States v. Souza, 223 F.3d 1197 (10th Cir. 2000). In the published government instrument 
cases, courts have given latitude to the FBI and DEA. By and large, the published Fourth Amendment cases 
involving government instruments were narcotics or child pornography cases.  The accused conduct in 
these cases is arguably far more nefarious than that of a garden-variety tax shelter case.  It is possible that 
the Service may not enjoy such latitude because of the subject matter of its tips.  Because courts may not 
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ii. The Second Factor 
 
In the two-factor test to determine whether a whistleblower is a government 
instrument, the second factor examines the intent of the searching party.  More 
specifically, the test seeks to ascertain the intent of the party to become a governmental 
agent.  The Sixth Circuit has explicitly stated that “a party is subject to the [F]ourth 
[A]mendment only when he or she has formed the necessary intent to assist in the 
government’s investigative or administrative functions; in other words, he or she intends 
to engage in a search or seizure.”150   
 
In employee whistleblower cases, the government instrument determination would 
typically turn on the first factor, because many tax whistleblowers gather evidence to turn 
over to the Service in an effort to bring a taxpayer to justice.151  Other possible scenarios 
exist.  Some whistleblowers collect evidence to protect themselves and use as bargaining 
chips to secure their own immunity.152  Here, as with the first factor, an ongoing 
relationship between a whistleblower and the government is also important albeit for a 
different reason.  Because the second factor examines a whistleblower’s motivation, a 
relationship with the government where the whistleblower is rewarded financially or with 
leniency may have bearing. 153   For example, in Walther, the ongoing financial 
relationship between the government and the informant seemed persuasive to the court, 
and the court deemed the information obtained through Walther informant’s searches 
subject to the exclusionary rule.  It is unclear, however, whether it is the ongoing 
relationship itself or financial motivation that was dispositive to the court.  Three circuits 
consider the presence of a governmental reward as motivation for a search.154 While these 
                                                                                                                                            
consider the illegal shelter of income as egregious as the violation of narcotics or child pornography laws, 
courts may not be as likely to give the Service the latitude it grants the FBI and DEA.  Nonetheless, it is 
unlikely that courts would not grant any latitude in tax cases.  There is no logic to support granting latitude 
to the government in child pornography and narcotics cases but not in tax cases.  Accordingly, it follows 
that the government will receive at least some latitude when receiving evidence from tax whistleblowers.       
150 United States v. McAllister, 18 F.3d 1412, 1418 (7th Cir. 1994). 
151 See e.g., United States v. Jarrett, 338 F.3d 339, 345 (4th Cir. 2003). 
152 See United States v. Feffer, 831 F.2d 734, 739 (1987).  See also Harper, 458 F.2d at 892. 
153 Compare United States v. Malbrough, 922 F.2d 458 (8th Cir. 1990) with United States v. Walther, 
652 F.2d 788 (9th Cir. 1981). In the Eighth Circuit’s Malbrough case, informant Kelley had previously 
agreed to participate in three narcotics purchases. In exchange for Kelley’s participation, the police agreed 
to refrain from filing burglary charges against Kelley. Without informing the police, Kelley invaded the 
defendant’s property on his own accord and brought back information of a marijuana greenhouse to the 
police. Although Kelley already had a preexisting relationship as an agent of the government, the court did 
not consider his search to be a governmental search in this case because the police never asked Kelley to 
seek out marijuana growers and had no knowledge of his actions until afterwards. The Court distinguished 
Kelley’s action from those of the informant in Walther. Specifically, the court noted that the government 
had routinely paid the Walther informant and that the government had knowingly acquiesced in the Walther 
informant’s searches. 
154 See Malbrough, 922 F.2d at 462 (citing U.S. v. Koenig, 856 F.2d 843, 847 (7th Cir. 1988)); United 
States v. McAllister, 18 F.3d 1412, 1417-8 (7th Cir. 1994) (citing Malbrough, 922 F.2d at 462). See also 
U.S. v. Ginglen, 467 F.3d 1071 (7th Cir. 2006) (“Other useful criteria are whether the private actor acted at 
the request of the government and whether the government offered the private actor a reward.” (internal 
citation omitted)); U.S. v. Shahid, 117 F.3d 322 (7th Cir. 1997) (“Other useful criteria are whether the 
private actor acted at the request of the government and whether the government offered the private actor a 
reward.”); Valdez v. New Mexico, 109 Fed. Appx. 257 (10th Cir. 2004) (“Other considerations are whether 
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circuits have noted the reward factor in governmental instrumentality analysis,155 none 
have decided a case in which the presence of an award was dispositive.    
 
3. Consequences and the Fourth Amendment  
 
If a whistleblower’s search is deemed an improper governmental search, a taxpayer 
may attempt to use the exclusionary rule to enforce the Fourth Amendment’s 
protections.156 A taxpayer is unlikely to be successful, however, because the rule is not 
typically applied to civil tax matters.    
 
The exclusionary rule “excludes from admission into evidence in federal and state 
criminal prosecutions that which is obtained in violation [of the Fourth Amendment] by 
unlawful governmental action.”157  The exclusionary rule also applies to evidence that is 
“the indirect product or ‘fruit’ “of improperly obtained evidence.158  The exclusionary 
rule is not a constitutional guarantee for taxpayers;159 rather, it is a judicial doctrine 
designed to deter Fourth Amendment abuses by disallowing evidence.160  
 
If invoked, the exclusionary rule could thwart an ongoing examination.  Even in the 
event that excluded evidence does not derail an examination, it could create a more 
expensive, labor-intensive examination to bring to completion.  The Service may also 
fear losing, not only a single examination or case, but of harming the ability to examine 
that taxpayer in the future.  Depending upon the type or scope of evidence excluded, it 
may affect more than one tax year or a multitude of items in future years.  In addition to 
thwarted examinations and extra costs, the Service may also be concerned about publicity 
of both its losses to taxpayers and its overreaches. Publicity of unfruitful examinations 
could tempt other taxpayers toward noncompliance.161 In addition, the Service’s past 
                                                                                                                                            
the informant performed the search at the request of the government and whether the government offered a 
reward.”). It is not clear why the Malbrough court considered assistance in exchange for a dismissed charge 
(that could have resulted in incarceration) as a permissible motivation for assisting the government, while 
presumably cash payments are not.   
155 See id. 
156 See David H. Taylor, Should it Take a Thief? Rethinking the Admission of Illegally Obtained 
Evidence in Civil Cases, 22 REV. LITIG. 625, 626-7 (2003). 
157See David H. Taylor, Should it Take a Thief? Rethinking the Admission of Illegally Obtained 
Evidence in Civil Cases, 22 REV. LITIG. 625, 626-7 (2003). 
158 United States v. Runyan, 275 F.3d 449, 466 (5th Cir. 2001) (citing Wong Sun v. U.S., 371 U.S. 471 
(1963)).  
159 See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 482 (U.S. 1976) (“The exclusionary rule was a judicially created 
means of effectuating the rights secured by the Fourth Amendment.”)  
160 See id. (“’The rule is calculated to prevent, not to repair. Its purpose is to deter -- to compel respect 
for the constitutional guaranty in the only effectively available way -- by removing the incentive to 
disregard it.’” (citing Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 (U.S. 1960))). 
161 See Joshua Blank, In Defense of Individual Taxpayer Privacy, 61 EMORY L. J. 265 (2011) (“that tax 
privacy enables the government to influence individuals' perceptions of its tax-enforcement capabilities by 
publicizing specific examples of its tax-enforcement strengths without exposing specific examples of its 
tax-enforcement weaknesses. The government publicizes specific examples whenever it reveals the details 
of any named individual's tax controversy. Because salient examples may implicate well-known cognitive 
biases, this strategic publicity function of tax privacy can cause individuals to develop an inflated 
perception of the government's ability to detect tax offenses, punish their perpetrators, and compel all but a 
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overreaches have invited both Congressional and public scrutiny.162  
 
Despite the potential risks of invocation of the exclusionary rule, the rule is very 
rarely applied outside the criminal context.163 When it is applied outside of criminal 
cases, it is even more rarely applied in civil tax cases. The Court employs a balancing 
test164 to determine whether to apply the exclusionary rule “beyond its core [criminal] 
application.”165 The Supreme Court balances the cost of frustrated law enforcement with 
“additional marginal deterrence” achieved by excluding evidence.166 Some cases have 
allowed improperly obtained evidence in criminal investigation to be given to another 
agency or sovereign for use in a subsequent civil proceeding.167 Courts are more 
skeptical, however, when the same agency attempts subsequent use in a civil 
proceeding,168 but some courts have even allowed the Service to use improperly obtained 
evidence in subsequent civil tax proceedings.169 Accordingly, while the list of risks may 
seem daunting, the chances that the rule is applied against the Service in a civil tax matter 
are very remote.   
 
While the Service must acknowledge, however small the risk, that whistleblower 
interactions could violate Fourth Amendment protections, the Service can mitigate any 
risk through properly tailored whistleblower policies, which are discussed in Part IV. By 
                                                                                                                                            
few outliers to comply. Without the curtain of tax privacy, by contrast, individuals could see specific 
examples of the government's tax-enforcement weaknesses that would contradict this perception.”).   
162 See Chris Stirewalt, Credibility Gap Worsens IRS Scandal, FOX NEWS FIRST, (July 23, 2014) 
(commenting on the decreased credibility of IRS Commissioner John Koskinen following claims the 
Service targeted Obama’s political foes) available at 
http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2014/07/23/credibility-gap-worsens-irs-scandal; Peggy Noonan, This is 
No Ordinary Scandal, WALL ST. J. (May 17, 2013) (discussing the Service’s scandal targeting conservative 
groups as harming the public’s ability to trust); Stop IRS Overreach Act, S.2043, 113th Cong. (2014) 
(introduced to prohibit the Service from asking taxpayers questions on religious, political or social beliefs). 
163 Compare Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole v. Scott, 524 U.S. 357, 363-364 (U.S. 1998) (“Recognizing 
these costs, we have repeatedly declined to extend the exclusionary rule to proceedings other than criminal 
trials.” (citing United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 909 (U.S. 1984), United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 
447 (U.S. 1976))) and Erin Murphy, The Politics of Privacy in the Criminal Justice System: Information 
Disclosure, the Fourth Amendment, and Statutory Law Enforcement Exemptions, 111 Mich. L. Rev. 485, 
523-524 (2013) (“Finally, many statutes are altogether silent on the question of additional remedies, 
including HIPAA, FERPA, COPPA, DNA, DPPA, FCRA, and the IRS Code. Naturally, litigants have 
argued that this silence allows for application of the exclusionary rule. For example, defendants have cited 
HIPAA regulations' explicit reference to the Fourth Amendment, along with the intimate nature of the 
covered material, as support for exclusion of evidence as a remedy for privacy violations by law 
enforcement. However, most courts have rejected that contention. The same kinds of arguments have also 
been raised and rejected with regard to claims made under FERPA, the DNA Act, FCRA, the Privacy Act, 
and the IRS Code.” (internal citation omitted)), with United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 455 (U.S. 1976) 
(“Respondent argues, however, that the application of the exclusionary rule to civil proceedings long has 
been recognized in the federal courts. He cites a number of cases.” (internal citations omitted)).  
164 See United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 447-60 (U.S. 1976). 
165 See United States v. Speck, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8795 *9 (N.D. Ca. 1997). 
166  See Janis, at 448, 453. See also Speck, at *10. 
167 See e.g., Grimes v. C.I.R., 82 F.3d 286 (9th Cir. 1996), Janis, at 448. 
168 See e.g., Tirado v. C.I.R., 689 F.2d 307, 312 (2d Cir. 1982) and Pizzarello v. U.S., 408 F.2d 579, 
586 (2d Cir. 1969). 
169 See e.g., Weiss v. Commissioner, 919 F.2d 115 (9th Cir. 1990); Houser v. Commissioner, 96 T.C. 
184 (T.C. 1991) 
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disseminating clear guidance to personnel on the parameters and the systematic collection 
of information designed to flag potential issues before they arise, the Service can create 
an effective policy.  After all, law enforcement and other federal agencies successfully 
work with informants and whistleblowers while avoiding the exclusionary rule.  
Debriefing a whistleblower is entirely possible without the fear of tainted evidence. 
 
B.  Taxpayer Privacy Implications in Whistleblower Debriefing 
 
Some have claimed that taxpayer privacy inhibits whistleblower debriefing but this 
position misunderstands taxpayer privacy law.  Taxpayer privacy is an overarching 
concern for the Service,170 and this concern carries into the whistleblower area.171 The 
following discusses the alternatives available to the Service to facilitate disclosing 
taxpayer information to a whistleblower during debriefing.   
 
Taxpayer privacy is generally governed by § 6103, which forbids any federal 
employee from disclosing any tax return172 or return information.173  Section 6103’s 
broad protection of federal tax information has more than a dozen categorical 
exceptions.174  Three of these exceptions could be used by the Service to disclose a 
taxpayer’s information to a whistleblower.175 These include exceptions under § 6103(n) 
for tax administration contracts, § 6103(k)(6) for an investigative purpose, and § 
6103(h)(4) for administrative and judicial proceedings.   
 
1. Tax Administration Contract Exception 
 
Section 6103(n) allows the Service to disclose return information “to any person . . . 
                                                
170 The Service has been statutorily required to protect taxpayer information since 1976. See Kwon, 
supra note __ at n.143 (2010) (citing PRIVACY PROT. STUDY COMM'N, FEDERAL TAX RETURN 
CONFIDENTIALITY, 13-14 (Jun. 1976); OFFICE OF TAX POLICY DEP'T OF TREASURY, REPORT TO CONGRESS 
ON SCOPE AND USE OF TAXPAYER CONFIDENTIALITY AND DISCLOSURE PROVISIONS, VOL. 1: STUDY OF 
GENERAL PROVISIONS, 21 (2000); JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE TAX 
REFORM ACT OF 1976, H.R. 10612, 94th Cong., 313, 314-15 (1976), reprinted in 1976-3 C.B. (vol. 2) 1, 
335). 
171 See Michael Sullivan, Best Practices in Pursuing IRS Whistleblower Claims: an Interview with IRS 
Whistleblower Office Director Stephen A. Whitlock, 52 FALSE CLAIMS ACT & QUI TAM Q. REV. 81, 90 
(2009) (quoting Whitlock as stating “you have to begin by understanding that the IRS puts a premium on 
protecting confidentiality. We have statutory requirement to protect the confidentiality of taxpayer returns 
and return information is broadly defined. It includes information about the whistleblower, so that’s 
taxpayer information within the scope of the statutory protection. And there’s a culture in the IRS about 
protecting taxpayer information, so we start from there.”) available at  http://www.qui-tam-
litigation.com/files/steve_whitlock_interview_with_michael_sulivan_2009.pdf.   
172 I.R.C. §6103(b)(1) (defining a tax return as “any tax or information return, declaration of estimated 
tax, or claim for refund . . ..”). 
173 I.R.C. § 6103(b)(2) (defining return information primarily as “a taxpayer’s identity, the nature, 
source, or amount of his income, payments, receipts, deductions, exemptions, credits, assets, liabilities, net 
worth, tax liability, tax withheld, deficiencies, overassessments, or tax payments, whether the taxpayer’s 
return was, is being, or will be examined or subject to other investigation  . . ..”).  See also Blank, supra 
note __ at  267 (2011) (citing I.R.C. § 6103 (a), (b)(2), (c)).  
174 See I.R.C. § 6103(c) – (o). 
175 See I.R.C. § 6103(h)(4), (k)(6), (n). 
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for the purposes of tax administration.”176 The Service has interpreted “for the purposes 
of tax administration” to permit contracts with whistleblowers and has adopted a 
regulation governing whistleblower contracts.177 A close reading of that regulation, 
however, describes less of a contract and more of a confidentiality agreement that gives 
the Service permission to waive its privacy obligations to a taxpayer and requires a 
whistleblower to keep the disclosed information confidential.178 The regulation does not 
describe a quid pro quo exchange; rather, it focuses on providing an exception to the 
Service’s taxpayer privacy requirement.  
 
Together § 6103(n) and Treasury Regulation § 301.6103(n)-2 provide the Service an 
exception to taxpayer privacy that would permit whistleblower debriefing.  The Service, 
however, has chosen not to utilize this exception.  Whistleblower experts have publicly 
stated that they are unaware of the Service’s use of a tax administration contract with any 
whistleblower,179 and some have questioned if the Service’s reluctance to enter into 
contracts with whistleblowers is hindering the Service’s effective pursuit of 
whistleblower tips and hampering communication with whistleblowers.180  
 
From the Service’s perspective, § 6103(n) whistleblower contracts offer additional 
benefits but certain undesirable consequences. Currently, the Service receives more than 
7,500 whistleblower tips annually, suggesting that the Service is not faced with a lack of 
tips or incoming flow of information.181  While streamlining and sifting/sorting the 
informational flow may be an obstacle for the Service, the Whistleblower Office and the 
Service business units likely see little upside to using a contract to gain additional 
information given the numerous tips received.  It is possible that a contract disclosing 
return information to a whistleblower could uncover more substantial tax evasion than the 
                                                
176 See I.R.C. § 6103(n).  
177 See 26 C.F.R. §  301.6103(n)-2 (describing the Service’s discretion to enter into § 6013(n) contracts 
by allowing the Service “to disclose return information to a whistleblower  . . . in connection with a written 
contract among the [IRS], the whistleblower . . ..”). 
178 See 26 C.F.R. § 301.6103(n)-2 (c) (enforcing whistleblower’s confidentiality with civil and criminal 
penalty provisions). See also I.R.C. §§ 7431, 7213, and 7213A (penalty provisions). 
179 Criticism of the Service’s avoidance of § 6013(n) contracts has come primarily from whistleblower 
attorneys who desire a closer, more productive relationship with the Service in hopes of more likely award 
payment for their clients. It follows that whistleblower attorneys would seek a formalized relationship 
between their clients and the Service to create a legal obligation for award payment.  See 2013 Public 
Hearing on Proposed Regulations, (statement of Scott Oswald) (commenting that contracts with 
whistleblowers have never been entered into and stating that other areas of whistleblower practice utilize 
contractual arrangements with the whistleblower and the Service has failed to utilize contractual 
relationships although they are authorized to enter into contracts in I.R.C. § 6103(n)).); Letter from Sen. 
Charles Grassley, U.S. Senate, to Steven Miller, Acting Commissioner, Internal Revenue Serv., Hon. Neal 
S. Wolin, Acting Secretary, Dept. of Treasury, and Hon. Mark Mazur, Assist. Sec. for Tax Policy, Dept. of 
Treasury, (Jan. 28, 2013) [hereinafter Grassley Letter to Miller, Wolin and Mazur] (acknowledging the 
Service has permission to enter into contracts with whistleblowers yet he was unaware of any instances 
where a contract between the Service and a whistleblower was used); Coder, _____, supra note __ (stating 
in the final regulations the Service seemed to contemplate the use of a contract with a whistleblower, but it 
has not yet used the agreement).  
180 See Grassley Letter to Miller, Wolin and Mazur, supra note__ (commenting on the lack of 
communication and lack of contracts as a failure to use whistleblowers and their advisors resulting in a 
crippling of the administration of the program). 
181 See WHISTLEBLOWER OFFICE FY 2012 REPORT, supra notes 4-5 and accompanying text. 
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whistleblower already disclosed or clarify a whistleblower’s previously made disclosures; 
however, such additional benefit is speculative.  The outcome would not be known until 
after the contract had been executed and the disclosure made, which compounds the 
uncertainty involving a contract.  
 
 In contrast, use of a § 6103 contract has certain consequences for the Service.182 
Using a whistleblower contract shifts the relationship balance of power between the 
Service and whistleblower.  Currently, the Service has greater power in the relationship.  
Tax whistleblowers self-identify by submitting a compensable tip.183  There is no other 
legal market for the tax tips. A whistleblower could seek compensation for the 
information illegally via blackmail, but no other legally permissible market participant 
will pay for the whistleblower’s information other than the Service.184  As the only legal 
consumer of compensable tips, the balance of power is in the Service’s favor.  The 
Service’s position is further strengthened because it has complete discretion on whether 
to act on the tip.185  It is only after the Service has chosen to pursue the tip and 
successfully collected proceeds (or denied the claim entirely) that a whistleblower gains 
rights and the balance of power begins to move away from the Service.186  One might 
argue that a whistleblower is powerful because he or she may be the sole source of 
information necessary for a tax prosecution; however, absent a whistleblower’s self-
identification as a whistleblower (via tip submission), the Service would usually be 
unaware such information exists.  
 
A whistleblower contract could also open a Pandora’s box of contractual obligations. 
A contract would require the Service to provide the whistleblower consideration.187 The 
Service’s consideration cannot be rights that the whistleblower already possesses.188  The 
                                                
182 If the Service enters into a contract with a whistleblower, the contractual formalization of the 
relationship itself implies a more equal power relationship. Even the bargaining itself grants a 
whistleblower more power than he/she would have otherwise had.   
183 See I.R.M. 25.2.2.3(1), Submission of Information for Award under Sections 7623(a) or (b), (as 
amended Jun. 18, 2010) (“Individuals submitting information under section 7623(a) or (b) must complete 
IRS Form 211, Application for Award for Original Information”.). 
184 Other federal whistleblower programs provide compensation for tips; however, no other federal 
whistleblower program is tasked with compensating tips for reporting tax violations.   
185 See I.R.M. 25.2.2.5(1)(F), Grounds for Not Processing Claims for Award, (as amended Jun. 18, 
2010) (Claims will not be processed “that upon initial review have no merit or that lack sufficient specific 
and credible information.”). 
186 See Prop. Reg. § 301.7623-3(b)(1), 77. Fed. Reg. 74798 (Dec. 18, 2012) (corrected on Feb. 5, 2013 
at 78 Fed. Reg. 8062) (“If the claimant believes that the Whistleblower Office erred in evaluating the 
information provided, the claimant has 30 days from the date the Whistleblower Office sends the 
preliminary award recommendation to submit comments to the Whistleblower Office. The Whistleblower 
Office will review all comments submitted timely by the claimant (or the claimant's legal representative, if 
any) and pay an award, pursuant to paragraph (b)(2) of this section.”).  See also Prop. Reg. § 301.7623-
3(c)(3), 77. Fed. Reg. 74798 (Dec. 18, 2012) (corrected on Feb. 5, 2013 at 78 Fed. Reg. 8062) (the 
whistleblower “will have 30 days…from the date of the preliminary award recommendation letter to 
respond to the preliminary award recommendation…”). 
187 See 2-5 Corbin on Contracts § 5.8 (2013) ("The definition of consideration given in Currie v. 
Misa, is often used by American courts . . . : 'A valuable consideration ... may consist either in some right, 
interest, profit, or benefit, accruing to the one party, or some forbearance, detriment, loss, or responsibility 
given, suffered, or undertaken by the other." (citing Law. Rep. 10 Ex. 153 (1875)). 
188 A contract requires bargained-for exchange. See 2-5 Corbin on Contracts § 5.1 (2013) ("The term 
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Service may argue that it provides consideration by giving a whistleblower access to a 
taxpayer’s return information.  However, Regulation § 301.6103(n)-2 gives the Service 
the discretion over whether it performs the disclosure,189 which may also be insufficient 
consideration.190 If the contract is, as the regulation states, “a written contract for 
services,” then the Service’s consideration is most likely payment for those services.191  
Such a contract would be at odds with the most basic requirements of the § 7623(b) 
whistleblower program, namely compensation based on collected proceeds.192   
 
 The contract could also implicate agency duties to cooperate and compensate a 
whistleblower,193 which the Service is not incentivized to undertake.194  The Service may 
                                                                                                                                            
'consideration' has been used . . . to denote one reason deemed sufficient for enforcement of promises: the 
bargained-for exchange.  . . . [T]o have consideration there must be, at a minimum, a bargained-for 
exchange."). If, in the contract, the Service only grants the whistleblower rights that he/she already has, 
then the Service will not have provided adequate consideration. This is not adequate consideration because 
the grant of rights would be a pre-existing duty, which is an impermissible category of consideration. See 2-
7 Corbin on Contracts § 7.1 (2013) ("The very frequently stated rule is that neither the performance of duty 
nor the promise to render a performance already required by duty is a consideration for a return promise. 
This rule is known as the "pre-existing duty rule."). 
189 See 26 C.F.R. § 301.6103(n)-2 (b)(1) (““[d]isclosure of return information in connection with a 
written contract for services  . . . shall be made only to the extent the IRS deems it necessary in connection 
with the reasonable or proper performance of the contract.”). 
190 If a party can choose whether to perform its promise, then the consideration is an illusory promise, 
which is another category of impermissible consideration. See 2-5 Corbin on Contracts § 5.28 (2013) ("If 
the promisor bargains for some sort of real promise, and receives only an illusion, there is no contract for 
the reason that the offer has not been accepted as well as for the reason that there is no consideration for the 
offeror's promise."). See also 1-1 Corbin on Contracts § 1.17 (2013) ("As this term itself implies, an 
illusory promise is not a promise at all as that term has been herein defined. If the expression appears to 
have the form of a promise, this appearance is an illusion. Suppose, for example, that X guarantees 
payment of P's note in return for C's written promise to forbear from suing P as long as C wishes to forbear. 
In this case C's words may create the illusion of a promise, but, in fact, C has made no promise. The 
fundamental element of promise is a promisor's expression of intention that the promisor's future conduct 
shall be in accord with the present expression, irrespective of what the promisor's will may be when the 
time for performance arrives. In the supposed case, the words used by C are not such as may reasonably be 
relied upon by P. The clear meaning of the expression is that C's future conduct will be in accord with his 
or her own future will, just as it would have been had nothing at all been said."). 
191 26 C.F.R. § 301.6103(n)-2. 
192 See I.R.C. § 7623(b). Even if the contract specified that payment could not be made until proceeds 
were collected (as per the statute and regulations), the Service has such control over the processes of 
whether the tip is pursued, how the examination is conducted, whether to compromise a tax deficiency, and 
how/when collection is obtained, that compensation under such a contract could be considered an illusory 
promise.    
 193 Even assuming that the Service provided legally sufficient consideration and entered into a 
“contract for services” with a whistleblower, such a contract implicates agency questions. An agreement 
where one party acts on behalf of another is an agency. See Restatement of Law, Third, Agency § 1.01  
(2006) (“Agency is the fiduciary relationship that arises when one person (a ‘principal’) manifests assent to 
another person (an ‘agent’) that the agent shall act on the principal's behalf and subject to the principal's 
control, and the agent manifests assent or otherwise consents so to act.”). If an agency is created by a § 
6103(n) contract, then the Service becomes the principal, and a principal has duties to its agent. See 
Restatement of Law, Third, Agency § 8.13 (2006) (“A principal has a duty to act in accordance with the 
express and implied terms of any contract between the principal and the agent. In particular, a principal has 
a duty of compensation to its agent. See Restatement of Law, Third, Agency § 8.13, comment d (2006) 
(“Unless an agreement between a principal and an agent indicates otherwise, a principal has a duty to pay 
compensation to an agent for services that the agent provides.”).  A principal also has a duty to cooperate 
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also be reluctant to create an agency relationship with a whistleblower because it wants to 
avoid deputizing a whistleblower. The covenant of good faith and fair dealing could also 
obligate the Service in a whistleblower contract.195  Finally, the language used within § 
301.6103-(n)(2)(b)(3) could obligate the Service to respond to whistleblower inquiries 
about the status of the claim.196   
 
While the code and regulation permit contractual arrangement between the 
whistleblower and the Service in section § 6103(n), a whistleblower contract exposes the 
Service to potential hazards.  It follows that the Service may perceive a contract as too 
risky and too costly when compared its potential benefits.  
 
2. The Administrative/Judicial Proceeding Exception 
 
Another exception for disclosing taxpayer information to whistleblowers is found in § 
6103(h)(4) and relates to administrative and judicial proceedings.197  Subparagraph (h)(4) 
allows the Service to disclose return information in an administrative or judicial 
proceeding if “the proceeding arose out of, or in connection with, determining the 
                                                                                                                                            
with its agent. See Restatement of Law, Third, Agency § 8.13, comment b (2006) (“A principal's implied 
contractual duty of good faith and fair dealing obliges the principal to refrain from unreasonable 
interference with the agent's completion of work. The principal is subject to this duty when the principal 
has agreed to furnish an agent with an opportunity for work, in addition to agreeing to compensate the 
agent.”).   
194 The Service is currently attracting tips and cooperation of whistleblowers without obligating itself 
to provide any mandatory compensation or cooperation.  Any duty of the Service to compensate and/or 
cooperate with a whistleblower is restrained by various limits in the statute, regulations and IRM.  
Presumably, the Service created the regulatory and IRM restrictions to allow for discretion in the use of 
whistleblowers. 
195 Additional contractual concerns arise when the Service and a whistleblower enter into a § 6103(n) 
agreement.  When the Service enters into a contract with a private citizen, the contractual requirement of 
good faith and fair dealing still governs the transaction. See Fredrick W. Claybrook Jr., Good Faith in the 
Termination and Formation of Federal Contracts, 56 MD. L. REV. 555 (1997) (citing United States v. 
Bostwick, 94 U.S. 5, 66 (1876), United States v. Winstar Corp., 116, S. Ct. 2432, 2464-65 (1996) (plurality 
opinion)).   Good faith requires prevents a party from denying the benefit of the contract to the other party. 
See 6-26 Corbin on Contracts § 26.1 (2013) (“[I]n every contract there is an implied covenant that neither 
party shall do anything which will have the effect of destroying or injuring the right of the other party to 
receive the fruits of the contract, which means that in every contract there is an implied obligation of good 
faith and fair dealing.” (citing Kirke La Shelle Co. v. Paul Armstrong Co., 263 N.Y. 79, 87, 188 N.E. 163, 
167 (1933))).  Is the Service fulfilling good faith when its actions prevent collected proceeds from being 
fully realized?  A whistleblower may be misled into thinking his or her cooperation is guaranteeing 
eventual award payment.  The existing statutory, regulatory and administrative process prevent the Service 
from making award guarantees.    
196 Under § 301.6103-(n)(2)(b)(3), a whistleblower may inquire about the status of the submitted claim. 
See 26 C.F.R. § 301.6103(n)-2 (b)(3). The Service’s obligation to answer the inquiry is not clear. The 
regulation does not use mandatory language to describe the Service’s response.  Rather, the regulation uses 
permissive language that the Service “may inform” the whistleblower of the claim’s status.  On its face, the 
regulation does not obligate the Service to answer the whistleblower’s inquiry.  The regulation further 
limits disclosure when it impedes or impairs the investigation. See 26 C.F.R. § 301.6103(n)-2 (b)(3). 
Nonetheless, this murky inquiry privilege may be yet another source of the Service’s caution in entering 
into a tax administration contract under § 6103(n).   
197 See 26 U.S.C. § 6103(h)(4). 
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taxpayer’s civil or criminal liability.” 198 This exception contemplates the use of a 
taxpayer’s return information in a proceeding where the information is at issue or is 
related to the proceeding.  This exception could apply to a whistleblower award claim if 
(1) the whistleblower tip is sufficiently connected with determining the taxpayer’s tax 
liability, and (2) the whistleblower’s claim is a proceeding.   
 
For the first factor, sufficient nexus to satisfy (h)(4) may be found within the 
language within § 7623, its regulations, and the Internal Revenue Manual.  The Service 
has taken the position that, under § 7623, whistleblower awards may only be paid from 
proceeds collected from a taxpayer “by reason of information provided.”199  Collected 
proceeds are produced only from the assessment and collection of tax liability, interest or 
penalties from a taxpayer.200  Assessment and collection of proceeds could be considered 
to be “in connection with, determining the taxpayer’s civil . . . liability, or the collection 
of such civil liability.”  
 
 As for the second factor, the Service has repeatedly taken the position that a 
whistleblower claim can result in an administrative proceeding.201 However, the Service’s 
most recent identification of the commencement of a whistleblower administrative 
proceeding eliminates the Service’s ability to use this § 6013 exception for whistleblower 
debriefing.  Previously, the Service identified the filing of the initial whistleblower claim 
as the beginning of a whistleblower administrative proceeding. 202   If the filing a 
whistleblower claim or tip marks the beginning of an administrative proceeding, then 
subsequent actions in the proceeding, including the claim investigation, appears to fall 
within the exception.  More recently proposed regulations identify much later events as 
the trigger for an administrative proceeding.203 For § 7623(b) claims,204 the Proposed 
                                                
198 See 26 U.S.C. § 6103(h)(4) (emphasis added). 
199 26 C.F.R. § 301.7623-1(a)(2). 
200 See I.R.C. § 7623(b)(1).  See also supra note 48 and accompanying text. 
201 See I.R.M. 25.2.2.8 Whistleblower Award Administrative Proceeding (as amended Jun. 18, 2010). 
(“The whistleblower award review and determination process is an administrative proceeding that begins 
on the date the claim for award is received by the Whistleblower Office.”); Prop. Reg. § 301.7623-3(b)(1), 
77. Fed. Reg. 74798 (Dec. 18, 2012) (corrected on Feb. 5, 2013 at 78 Fed. Reg. 8062) (“The whistleblower 
administrative proceeding described in paragraphs (b)(1) and (2) of this section begins on the date the 
Whistleblower Office sends the preliminary award recommendation letter.”); Prop. Reg. § 301.7623-3(c), 
77. Fed. Reg. 74798 (Dec. 18, 2012) (corrected on Feb. 5, 2013 at 78 Fed. Reg. 8062) (“The whistleblower 
administrative proceeding described in paragraphs (c)(1) through (6) of this section begins on the date the 
Whistleblower Office sends the preliminary award recommendation letter.”). 
202 See I.R.M. 25.2.2.8 Whistleblower Award Administrative Proceeding (as amended Jun. 18, 2010) 
(“The whistleblower award review and determination process is an administrative proceeding that begins 
on the date the claim for award is received by the Whistleblower Office.”). 
203 The proposed regulations make a distinction between the claims filed under § 7623(a) and § 
7623(b). See Prop. Reg. § 301.7623-3, 77. Fed. Reg. 74798 (Dec. 18, 2012) (corrected on Feb. 5, 2013 at 
78 Fed. Reg. 8062). 
204 For 7623(a) claims, for which the Service maintains discretion over award payment, the Proposed 
Regulations identify the start of the administrative proceeding as when the Service issues a preliminary 
award recommendation. Because the Service has discretion to pay a § 7623(a) award, the proposed 
regulations provide that an award denial under § 7623(a) is not an administrative proceeding.  Only the 
recommendation of an award amount rises to the level, under the Proposed Regulations.  See Prop. Reg. § 
301.7623-3(b)(1), 77. Fed. Reg. 74798 (Dec. 18, 2012) (corrected on Feb. 5, 2013 at 78 Fed. Reg. 8062). 
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Regulations state that an administrative proceeding commences when the Service issues a 
preliminary award recommendation or an award denial letter.205   
 
 The Service has not explained its reasons for proposing a later date, but a 
consequence of a later date is lower administrative costs through reduced exposure to Tax 
Court litigation from whistleblowers. If the beginning of an administrative proceeding 
occurred at the filing of a whistleblower’s claim, the Service would grant whistleblowers 
earlier availability to challenge an award determination in Tax Court.206 By postponing 
the administrative proceeding start, the Service may have limited its Tax Court burden.  
A side effect of that decision is that the Service limited its ability to use the 
administrative proceeding exception to taxpayer privacy.207 If the Service had interpreted 
the start of a whistleblower administrative proceeding differently, this exception could 
have permitted disclosure of taxpayer’s return information during whistleblower 
debriefing.   
 
3. The Investigative Purpose Exception 
 
 Both the tax administration contract and administrative proceeding exceptions to 
taxpayer privacy had the potential to permit whistleblower debriefing; however, the 
Service’s current choices with respect to contracts and whistleblower claims have limited 
the utility of the aforementioned exceptions.  Consequently, the investigative purpose 
exception offers the sole exception to taxpayer privacy that permits whistleblower 
debriefing.  Fortunately, this exception provides the Service with nearly boundless 
authority to disclose taxpayer information to whistleblowers.  
 
 Section 6103(k)(6) allows disclosure of tax return information if the disclosure is 
“necessary” to obtain information not otherwise available for “audit, collection activity, 
or civil or criminal tax investigation or any other offense under the internal revenue 
                                                
205 See Prop. Reg. § 301.7623-3(c), 77. Fed. Reg. 74798 (Dec. 18, 2012) (corrected on Feb. 5, 2013 at 
78 Fed. Reg. 8062). 
206 Section 7623(b)(4) gives whistleblowers the right to appeal to Tax Court “any determination 
regarding an award.” I.R.C. § 7623(b)(4). A determination can be an award, denial of an award, and even a 
refusal to issue an award or denial. See I.R.C. § 7623(b)(4) (“any determination regarding an award”); 
Cooper v. Commissioner, 135 T.C. 70 (2010) (“The statute expressly permits an individual to seek judicial 
review in this Court of the amount or denial of an award determination.”); Order in Insigna v. 
Commissioner (T.C. Mar. 13, 2013) (No. 4609-12W) (“[W]e have jurisdiction if there has been ‘[a]ny 
determination regarding an award.’ If the IRS has in fact finished its consideration of an award claim and 
has not made an award, then evidently it has "determined" to conclude the matter administratively without 
granting an award. In order for us to decide whether (as petitioner contends) the IRS has made such a 
defacto determination, we may need to learn: whether the IRS has completed its consideration of 
petitioner's claim; what, if anything, the IRS is still doing with regard to petitioner's claim; and whether the 
IRS expects to do anything in the future with regard to petitioner's claim.  If there has been a cessation of 
administrative action, then a reviewable determination may have been effectively made thereby.”). Once 
the Service establishes that an administrative proceeding has begun in the whistleblower process, it follows 
that a “determination” must result from the administrative proceeding.   
207 Given the large number of pending whistleblower claims perhaps the Service is attempting to avoid 
the potential administrative burden of litigating a large number of whistleblower award determinations. See 
WHISTLEBLOWER OFFICE FY 2012 REPORT, supra note __ and accompanying text. 
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laws.”208  The corresponding regulation adds the requirement that the Service employee 
must “reasonably believe, under the facts and circumstances, at the time of a disclosure, 
the information is not otherwise reasonably available, or if the activity connected with the 
official duties cannot occur properly without the disclosure.”209  The investigative 
purpose exception provides the Service with expansive authority to disclose return 
information. This exception does not limit who may be a recipient of the disclosure so 
long as the disclosure itself is “necessary.”  Similarly, the purposes for which disclosure 
may be made are also limited only by a list covering most Service functions.210  The 
requirements of “necessary” for the investigation and not otherwise “reasonably available” 
are very low bars for disclosing taxpayer information to a whistleblower during 
debriefing. The Service’s current whistleblower debriefing policy, as articulated in the 
2012 Deputy Commissioner’s Memo, presumably relies on the § 6103(k)(6) investigative 
purpose exception when it encouraged whistleblower debriefing.211  
 
4. Consequences and Taxpayer Privacy 
 
Similar to the Fourth Amendment analysis previously discussed, violations of 
taxpayer privacy are unlikely to result in a thwarted examination.212  The Service appears 
to be reluctant to disclose taxpayer information to whistleblowers despite the availability 
of a broad investigative purpose exception. This is highly ironic, considering that in 2012 
the Service reported that 8.3 billion disclosures were made pursuant to § 6103 
exceptions.213  The Service’s reluctance to disclose to whistleblowers is likely related to 
the inability to control any subsequent disclosure by a whistleblower and fear of personal 
ramifications.   
 
 The Service may be reluctant to use the investigative purpose exception because, 
once it discloses taxpayer return information to a whistleblower under this exception, the 
Service has limited control over any subsequent disclosures by the whistleblower.  Unlike 
                                                
208 See I.R.C. § 6103(k)(6) (“An internal revenue officer or employee and an officer or employee of the 
Office of Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration may, in connection with his official duties 
relating to any audit, collection activity, or civil or criminal tax investigation or any other offense under the 
internal revenue laws, disclose return information to the extent that such disclosure is necessary in 
obtaining information, which is not otherwise reasonably available, with respect to the correct 
determination of tax, liability for tax, or the amount to be collected or with respect to the enforcement of 
any other provision of this title. Such disclosures shall be made only in such situations and under such 
conditions as the Secretary may prescribe by regulation.”). 
209 26 C.F.R. § 301.6103(k)(6)-1(a)(2). 
210 26 C.F.R. § 301.6103(k)(6)-1(a). 
211 See Miller Memo, supra note __. 
212 See United States v. Orlando, 281 F.3d 586, 596 (6th Cir. Tenn. 2002) (noting that Congress has 
created statutory criminal and civil penalties for violations of taxpayer privacy but neither provision 
requires the exclusion of the underlying evidence obtained); Nowicki v. Comm’r, 262 F.3d 1162, 1163 (11th 
Cir. 2001) (finding the imposition of the exclusionary rule is not required for disclosure of return 
information that violates taxpayer privacy rights.); United States v. Stein, 2008 U.S. Dist. Lexis 74030, 7-8 
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 10, 2008) (stating that courts have created additional remedies for taxpayer privacy 
violations because Congress has already provided civil and criminal remedies). 
213 See Joint Committee on Taxation, Disclosure Report for Public Inspection Pursuant to Internal 
Revenue Code Section 6103(p)(3)(C) for Calendar Year 2012 (JCX-8-13), Apr. 15, 2013, 
https://www.jct.gov/publications.html?func=startdown&id=4514.  
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the administrative contract exception, there is no requirement for the recipient of the 
information to keep it confidential.  As Whistleblower Office Director Stephen Whitlock 
has stated publicly, “publicity is a two-edged sword.”214 Publicity may help or harm any 
particular Service investigation; however, disclosure of return information generally runs 
contrary to the Service’s culture.215   
 
  The consequences for violating taxpayer privacy may be more painful to the 
Service’s personnel than the sting of a lost evidentiary battle under the exclusionary 
rule.216 Violation of taxpayer privacy rights may lead to criminal or civil penalties as well 
as dismissal from employment.217 Aggrieved taxpayers may also file suit against the 
Service for civil damages when their returns or return information is improperly 
disclosed.218  Perhaps creating an even greater incentive within the Service to protect 
taxpayer privacy, § 7213(a)(1) authorizes criminal penalties for a Service employee’s 
willful disclosure of return information.219 All of these consequences, as frightful as they 
are, are for improper disclosures.  The investigative purpose exception requires only that 
a disclosure be “necessary” for the investigation and not otherwise “reasonably available” 
to be lawful.  A whistleblower debriefing that is undertaken for lawful purposes as part of 
an examination is necessary for the purposes of verifying allegations or investigating the 
extent of wrongdoing.  
 
Even if rarely invoked, the very existence of the criminal statute coupled with the 
zero tolerance policy likely creates a culture of hyper privacy protection within the 
Service.  While the Services faces a challenge in changing its culture and employees’ 
mindsets in creating a more engaging whistleblower debriefing policy, taxpayer privacy 
exceptions cannot be viewed as a barrier to whistleblower debriefing.    
 
IV. NEW APPROACHES TO DEBRIEFING  
 
The three previous Parts have explained how a Service culture resistant to 
whistleblowers, an overly burdensome administrative process, and mild legal obstacles 
                                                
214 See Sullivan, supra note __ at 91.  
215 See id. at 90 (quoting Whitlock as stating “the IRS puts a premium on protecting confidentiality”).  
216 Courts have also upheld Service’s zero tolerance policy for breaches of taxpayer privacy as well as 
employment dismissals. See Powers v. Department of the Treasury, 63 Fed. Appx. 480,48 (U.S. App. 
2003)(Service employee was fired for repeatedly accessing confidential taxpayer information without 
authorization.) See also Albritton v. Department of the Treasury, 287 Fed. Appx. 852, 853-854 (U.S. App. 
2008) (Albritton was a former Service employee fired for accessing taxpayer information to locate her 
bipolar son and the ex-husband of her niece. The court acknowledged the Service has a legitimate interest 
in maintaining such a high standard explaining that “each instance of unauthorized access to and/or 
disclosure of taxpayer information could erode the public’s confidence in the IRS and our ability to fairly 
administer the tax laws while safeguarding a taxpayer’s rights.”). 
217 See I.R.C. § 7213 and § 7431.  
218 See I.R.C. § 7431 (a)(1) (If a Service employee “knowingly, or by reason of negligence, inspects or 
discloses any return or return information with respect to a taxpayer in violation of any provision of section 
6103, such taxpayer may bring a civil action for damages against the United States.”). 
219 See I.R.C. § 7213(a)(1) (It is unlawful for a Service employee to “willfully disclose to any 
person…any return or return information. A violation will be a felony punishable “by a fine in any amount 
not exceeding $5,000, or imprisonment of not more than 5 years, or both…”). 
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have resulted in Service policies that fail to collect available information from 
whistleblowers.  These obstacles are not insurmountable, nor should they be permitted to 
relegate the tax whistleblower program to delays and inefficiencies. The Service should 
reconsider what it means to debrief a whistleblower, how debriefing occurs, and how 
debriefing might bring efficiencies to the program.  The following Part suggests specific 
improvements to the Service’s debriefing policies for more efficient tax enforcement.   
 
A.  The Service’s Definition of Debriefing 
Service’s policy pronouncements, in combination with other evidence, reveal that 
whistleblower debriefing occurs pre-examination, if at all, and involves a narrow set of 
topics. Indeed, Director Whitlock has publicly articulated the Service’s limited time 
period for debriefing.  In 2012, he was quoted as stating that “[t]he IRS does not involve 
whistleblowers in case analysis or audits. A whistleblower may be debriefed while the 
claim is being evaluated, before the audit has begun. . . . After the audit has begun, it's 
hands off.”220  This is particularly troublesome because, as the Service moves along in an 
examination, it is in a better position to ask relevant questions of a whistleblower. For 
sophisticated, multi-step, multi–entity, or international transactions, this is likely the 
situation.     
Given the preliminary stage at which the Service undertakes debriefing, 
unsurprisingly, the subjects covered appear to lack significant substance. What is 
surprising, however, is just how preliminary they are.  For the Service,221 debriefing is an 
administrative procedure ensuring legality of the whistleblower’s information and 
apprising the whistleblower of the Service’s policies.222  The Checksheet seeks only 
preliminary information; it primarily serves to ensure that a whistleblower is giving 
truthful, voluntary information and to advise the whistleblower that the Service will 
endeavor to protect the whistleblower’s identity throughout the lengthy process.223  
Nothing on the Checksheet asks for substantive information.  The Checksheet even fails 
to request basic information about the whistleblower, his or her relationship with the 
taxpayer, or other facts about the underlying tip. While it is possible that other, non-
public policies exist detailing substantive matters on which to question whistleblowers, 
making such policy public would equip whistleblower attorneys with the information 
necessary to allow them to serve as gatekeepers to proactively identify and funnel 
relevant information to the Service.  
 
B.  A Better Definition of Debriefing 
 
 The debriefing process should be utilized as another tool in the Service’s arsenal to 
provide key information during the entire investigation process.   Debriefing can be 
tremendously useful to the Service as it seeks to remedy systemic information 
                                                
220 See Lee A. Shepard, Whistleblower Officials Talk to Tax Haven Professionals, 135 TAX NOTES 811 
(May 14, 2012) (quoting Stephen Whitlock). 
221 This statement is based upon the 2010 Debriefing Checksheet. 
222 See I.R.M. Exhibit 25.2.2-4 Debriefing Checksheet (as amended Jun. 18, 2010). 
223 See id.  
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asymmetry.  The utility of debriefing may appear only after the Service staff has 
performed its due diligence of the transactions.  Prior to the investment of time, Service 
staff may not grasp the relevant questions.  The Service’s reluctance to utilize the 
whistleblower after initiation of an examination is an inefficient use of time and financial 
resources.   
 
The Service should view whistleblower information as a potential remedy against the 
inherent structural information asymmetry, and debriefing as a tool that promotes 
communication with the whistleblower.  To improve the debriefing process, the initial 
debriefing should expand far beyond the Checksheet to allow for detailed observational 
and substantive information that is not available from the written submission. Debriefing 
should seek to collect information for procedural, substantive and programmatic 
purposes.   
 
 Debriefing should collect information about the taxpayer, the whistleblower, and their 
relationship.  Successful debriefing should shed light on the motivation and veracity of 
the whistleblower, which may be useful as the Service’s investigates the claim. In 
addition, expanding the initial debriefing would also allow the Service to foresee 
potential Fourth Amendment limitations for subsequent searches.  
 
Fourth Amendment governmental instrument law, while not crystal clear or totally 
uniform, is not an impassable morass.  Several principles can be gleaned from the Fourth 
Amendment discussion in Part III.   First, to avoid deputizing IRS whistleblowers, the 
key inquiry will be whether the government knew of or acquiesced in a subsequent 
private search.  In the first contact that an employee whistleblower has with the Service, 
any documents that an employee whistleblower passes to the Service will be safely 
outside the scope of the first factor.  In other words, the private search would have 
occurred before the Service even knew about it.  There is no genuine Fourth Amendment 
concern with a prior search of which the Service has no contemporaneous knowledge.   
 
The issue then is, subsequent to a first meeting, can the Service avoid knowing about 
or acquiescing in any further searches?  The Service has previously avoided this issue by 
refusing subsequent whistleblower interviews.  This is not necessary.  Here, a simple 
solution may be a scripted disclaimer by the Service that the whistleblower acknowledges 
in writing.  The disclaimer would not be a “wink and a nod” as courts have discouraged.  
It would rather be a clear and thorough statement of law and policy that allows the 
Service to disclaim knowledge or acquiescence in any subsequent whistleblower 
search.224   
 
The Debriefing Checksheet’s current admonishment that a whistleblower should not 
                                                
224 The Service also has to grapple with the scope of its subsequent examination of documents from the 
prior private searches.  The Service should gather information about how far its examination may extend by 
asking questions about the extent to which a whistleblower has probed any documents given to the Service.  
If whistleblower’s answers are documented, then the Service will know the bounds that may not be crossed 
in expansion of a prior private search.  This is certainly an item that should be added to the Checksheet.  
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misinterpret a debriefing question as a request for the whistleblower to acquire more 
information is a nod towards avoiding tainted subsequent searches but it does not explain 
the issue and it does not firmly state that whistleblowers should not undertake any 
subsequent searches.  The current Checksheet statement is too subtle. Both the 
Checksheet and Service staff should be more definitive during first interviews so that the 
Service is protected against the possibility of tainted evidence but is not foreclosed from 
further information collection.  
 
Debriefing should also seek to collect substantive information. It should expand upon 
the information included in a whistleblower’s written submission.  While debriefing can 
occur pre-examination and assist in preparing for and guiding an exam, it should not be 
confined exclusively to pre-examination.  As explained above, neither taxpayer privacy 
nor search law requires such a limitation.  The Service can allow a whistleblower to serve 
as a monitor who prompts enforcement as well as a quasi-expert who provides guidance 
on sophisticated transactions during an examination.    
 
In addition, the Service should view debriefing as a device for opening 
communication with the whistleblower. A debriefing meeting offers the Service the 
opportunity to validate a whistleblower, his/her contribution, and instill in the 
whistleblower the impression that the Service will attempt to act upon the 
whistleblower’s information.  Whistleblowers who participate in debriefing throughout 
the investigation should feel more engaged in the process and this feeling of contributing 
to an important process may help offset the discontent of a long wait for an award.  Social 
science research suggests that fulfilling these whistleblower needs may have a positive 
effect on the future stream of tips.  
 
 Finally, the Service should use the debriefing process to collect information on 
whistleblower demographics, attributes, antecedents, tips attributes, and timing.  This 
information would allow the Service to analyze its current stream of tip and measure the 
program’s efficacy.  In addition to collecting information on examinations in which a 
whistleblower is debriefed, the Service should collect information on whistleblower-
identified examination in which a whistleblower is debriefed.  The Service needs to learn 
when to and how to debrief a whistleblower to ensure that debriefing is used efficiently. 
Collecting and analyzing this information is the key to future policy and program 
refinement.  Without this kind of data, the Service’s future policy refinements will be 
little more than blind guesses.   
 
C.  How Does Better Debriefing Fit into Whistleblower Policy? 
 
The Service should use subsequent debriefings with an employee whistleblower to 
gain insight and explanation of an employer’s tax transactions and develop an 
understanding the complexities of underlying tax transactions and taxpayer workpapers.  
Expanding debriefing in this fashion will improve the efficiency of the Whistleblower 
Program, but debriefing can also improve efficiency in other areas, especially in the 
determination of which tips to pursue.  Efficient sorting and screening of tips is an 
imperative component of a successful whistleblower program.  Given that whistleblower 
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motivations can be vengeful, ethical, monetary or some combination thereof, it follows 
that potential whistleblower tips are of a variety of kinds and quality.  When the tips 
arrive, the Service must efficiently sort out the least meritorious, least revenue-
generating, and resource-intensive tips.  Currently, the Service solely uses internal 
screening mechanisms, which are labor-intensive and a direct cost.  The Service could 
improve the process if debriefing moved beyond the Checksheet and served as a 
screening mechanism to quickly sort tips that are inefficient to pursue and prioritize the 
remaining tips.  Debriefing should not only be a forum in which to collect information 
but should also be used as a tool to promote efficiency.  The Service should reap process 
efficiencies in addition to informational benefits.   
 
The addition of the whistleblower should promote a more productive examination.  
The Service can measure an examination’s productivity by revenue generated, 
examination time, or a combination thereof. To ensure that whistleblower involvement 
does not burden the process, the Service must measure revenue, timing, and efficiency.  
More importantly, once baselines are established, the Service must set standards and add 
accountability to enforce the standards. The 2012 Miller Memo set timeframes for 
reviewing whistleblower claims.225  Specifically, the Memo set 90-day processing times 
during specific steps in the review of a whistleblower claim. The Memo suggests that the 
Service should take not more than 90 days for each of the following steps: (1) conduct an 
initial evaluation,226 (2) subject matter expert evaluation of the claim,227and (3) notify a 
whistleblower regarding final award determination.228  Currently, the 90-day timeframes 
are not being met.  The current averages are 131 days, 299 days, and 285 days, 
respectively.229 Because the Service never established baselines and has not published 
recent revenue, timing or efficiency comparators, it is difficult to determine whether 90-
day benchmarks are appropriate for these activities.  Moreover, the 2012 Memo’s 
timeframes present aspirational goals, but there is no accountability to ensure these 
timeframes are met.   
 
The Service should envision debriefing as a tool with which to streamline the 
administrative burden.  For example, over-involvement of counsel during an examination 
can lead to delays.  To limit counsel involvement, the Service should rewrite its 
whistleblower policies so that staff may more easily apply them without resorting to the 
time-consuming involvement of counsel.  Staff should be provided with clear guidance 
on the Fourth Amendment limitations and explanations of law and policies.  This would 
avoid applying case-by-case analysis to all whistleblowers cases. Guidance should also 
be given in a tone that promotes rather than dissuades whistleblower usage. 
 
The tone of whistleblower policy can also be used beyond debriefing.  The Service 
has, at its disposal, a potentially powerful enforcement mechanism in the form of 
                                                
225 See Miller Memo supra note __. 
226 See id.  
227 See id. 
228 See id. 
229 See Jeremiah Coder, IRS Sets Timelines for Action on Whistleblower Claims, TAX NOTES (Jun. 25, 
2012) (citing WHISTLEBLOWER OFFICE FY 2011 REPORT).  
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whistleblowers.  Reaping the potential efficiencies and assistance will require prioritizing 
promising cases involving whistleblowers and incentivizing staff to undertake these 
cases.  If the Service’s staff perceive that whistleblower involvement slows or burdens 
cases, then the Service should endeavor to eliminate the burdens and tip the scales in 
favor of these cases. Policy revisions that unburden whistleblower cases will likely have a 
greater effect on cultural resistance within the Service than any aspiration policy could 
ever hope to have.  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 While the Service’s current whistleblower debriefing policy is a welcome change 
from prior policies, it does not gather all available whistleblower information and 
ultimately fails to utilize whistleblowers throughout examinations.  Debriefing serves 
mainly as a review of a whistleblower’s legal rights and preliminary interview.  Despite 
calls for widespread whistleblower debriefing, the Service’s policies limit whistleblower 
debriefing and forbid whistleblower involvement during an ongoing examination.  
 
 While there are limitations to using employee whistleblowers resulting from Fourth 
Amendment restrictions and taxpayer privacy law, a review of applicable law shows 
significant latitude for government-whistleblower interactions during an investigation. 
The restrictions are navigable with policy changes and well-trained Service personnel.  
The Service should not resign itself to either under-utilizing or over-utilizing employee 
whistleblowers. To date, the Service has been overly cautious in its policies for 
maximizing the full potential of employee whistleblowers.  By expanding the Service’s 
conception of what it means to debrief, the Service can use whistleblower interviews to 
collect procedural, substantive and programmatic information.  The Service should also 
expand the time period during which it debriefs whistleblowers to include examinations.  
This would enable whistleblowers to serve dual functions of monitors who prompt 
enforcement and quasi-experts who provide guidance.    
 
 Above all, the Service should reimagine debriefing as more than a tool for 
information collection.  It can also be a tool for program and process improvement.  
Debriefing can be used to screen, sort, and prioritize whistleblower tips. Efficiencies can 
only be gained, however, if the Service gathers information on whistleblowers and their 
tips as well as measures the revenue, timings and efficiency of the processes.  The 
Service must ensure that measurement is accompanied by appropriate and attainable 
standards that are enforced with accountability.   
 
* * * 
 
 
 
